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“We would like our African brothers to know that we are not against unity but we have been 
occupied by a neighboring country”. 




“The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so decides 
directly or indirectly, through political, social and economic subjection of the South”. 
Father Saturnino Lohure (1921-1967)  






Post-colonial Africa has been riddled by numerous secessionist conflicts. Since the dawn of 
independence in the 1960s a number of African countries have experienced rebellions involving 
ethno-linguistic groups or marginalized regions demanding territorial separation from the state in 
order to establish new independent nations. This includes: Angola (Cabinda), Comoros (Anjouan 
and Mohedi), The Democratic Republic of Congo (Katanga, South Kassai) Ethiopia (Eritrea, 
Ogaden, and Oromia, Afar), Mali (Tuaregs), Niger (Tuaregs), Nigeria (Biafra, Niger Delta), 
Senegal (Casamance), Somalia (Somaliland) and Sudan (South Sudan). However, despite the 
prevalence of secessionist conflicts in the continent only two cases have succeeded resulting in 
the establishment of new states: Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011.  
This research seeks to explain the determinants of successful secessions in post-colonial Africa. 
This objective is achieved through an analysis of the dynamics of secession in Eritrea and South 
Sudan. Without any pretensions to establish theoretical causal generalizations, the study 
examines the conditions that have evolved out of the particular experiences of Eritrea and South 
Sudan to contend that both domestic and international politics play a decisive role in determining 
the outcome of secessionist conflicts in the continent. 
The research favors the qualitative methodological approach, makes use of descriptive data 
gathered from secondary sources and is informed by the theoretical assumptions of Wood‟s 
comparative analytical framework on secession and Coggins‟ international-level model of state 
birth. 
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1.1 Background to the Research 
 
The Republic of South Sudan emerged as Africa‟s 54
th
 state on July 9, 2011. South Sudan 
attained independence and sovereignty by formally withdrawing from the Republic of Sudan as a 
result of the phased implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This was a 
settlement signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People‟s Liberation 
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in 2005, making provisions for the exercise of the right of self-
determination through referendum by the people of Sudan‟s Southern provinces.  
 
Approximately eighteen years earlier, Eritrea achieved statehood following a United Nations-
sponsored referendum on independence. The plebiscite occurred in 1993 and marked the 
culmination of nearly thirty years of armed struggle opposing a number of Eritrean liberation 
movements and successive governments in Addis Ababa.  
 
The birth of the states of Eritrea and South Sudan represent a remarkable political development 
in post-colonial Africa as they constitute the only cases of successful secessions on the continent. 
The experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan are all the more extraordinary considering the 
incidence of insurgencies involving ethno-linguistic groups or ethnically homogeneous regions 
seeking to withdraw from their “parent” state in post-colonial Africa. In addition, the 
Organization of African Union (OAU) and the African Union‟s (AU) policies as well as the 
international community‟s preference for the status quo difficults the recognition of secessionist 
claims outside the colonial context (McNamee, 2012:3). 
 
In line with the above, this study investigates the determinants of successful secessions in post-
colonial Africa through an analysis of the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan. In addition, the 
study explores the immediate and remote causes of secessionist demands in Africa, the 
determining factors of successful secessionist bids in Eritrea and South Sudan as well as the 




1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
 
The death and birth of states is a defining feature of the international system. Indeed, the number 
of states has increased from just 25 in the early 1800s to about 194 as of 2006 (Kohen, 2006:2). 
In the course of the twentieth century alone an estimate of “150 states entered the system (and 
very few died), quadrupling the international community‟s membership roll” (Coggins, 
2011:437). Most states born during this period came into being through the processes of 
decolonization or secession.  
 
In Africa, the vast majority of states were formed out of colonial territories. As stated by 
Southall (1974:153): “more new nation states were formed in Africa during the 1960s than had 
been formed in the rest of the world for many centuries”. However, not every colonized nation in 
the continent achieved independence when the United Nations deliberated on the right to the 
self-determination of peoples (Coggins, 2011:438). In fact, African political elites decided to 
maintain the inherited colonial borders, transforming them into international boundaries between 
the emerging post-independent states (Hughes, 2004:834). These borders have repeatedly been 
criticized for their arbitrariness, that is “their propensity for bringing together peoples that 
historically lived under different, if not inimical systems” (Engelbert et al., 2001:1093). The 
specificity of interstate boundaries in Africa in conjunction with issues of governance has been at 
the origin of numerous secessionist conflicts in post-colonial Africa.  
 
As early as 1960 and 1970, Katanga and Biafra declared their independence from the Republic 
of Congo and the Federal Republic of Nigeria respectively (Bereketeab, 2012:3). Since then, the 
list of African states that have experienced secessionist insurgencies has grown. In this regard, 
Englebert (2014:147) provides a list that includes countries such as Angola (Cabinda), Comoros 
(Anjouan), The Democratic Republic of Congo (Katanga, South Kassai) Ethiopia (Eritrea, 
Ogaden, and Oromia, Afar), Mali (Tuaregs), Niger (Tuaregs), Nigeria (Biafra, Niger Delta), 
Senegal (Casamance), Somalia (Somaliland) and Sudan (South Sudan). McNamee (2012:14) 
points out that as of 2012 there were around six secessionist movements operating on the 
continent: Casamance, Cabinda, Zanzibar, Ogaden, Western Sahara and Somaliland  
 
Despite the high incidence of secessionist conflicts, post-colonial Africa has only seen the 
establishment of two new states outside the colonial context: Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 
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2011. Hence, it is relevant to examine what factors determine the successful outcome of 
secessionist demands in post-colonial Africa.  
 
This research focuses on the dynamics of secession in Eritrea and South Sudan to illustrate the 
submission that a combination of domestic and international factors play a decisive role in 
determining the successful outcome of secessionist demands.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The research endeavors to answer the following questions: 
 
1. What are the immediate and remote causes of secessionist demands in Africa? 
2. What factors drove the people of Eritrea and South Sudan to demand full independence 
and sovereignty from the Republics of Ethiopia and Sudan respectively? 
3. What factors account for the successful outcome of the secessionist movements in Eritrea 
and South Sudan respectively? 
4. What lessons can be drawn from the experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan in terms of 
the dynamics and determinants of successful secessions in post-colonial Africa? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of this research are to: 
  
1. Determine the remote and immediate causes of secessionist demands in Africa. 
2. Explore the motivations of the people of Eritrea and South Sudan to seek full 
independence and sovereignty from their respective “parent” states. 
3. Establish the determinants of successful secession in Eritrea and South Sudan.  
4. Articulate the lessons that can be drawn from the experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan 







1.5 Principal Theories upon which the Research Project is constructed 
 
There is more than chance involved in the study of secession. A set of patterns can often be 
discerned from the analysis of individual cases. To this end, several theories have been 
constructed to explain when and why secessions or attempts at secession take place. Theories of 
secession have been categorized into three distinct groups: explanatory, normative and legal 
(Pavikovic & Radan, 2011:171). Explanatory theories of secession are concerned with the social, 
political and economic factors leading to (or causing) secession. Normative theories of secession 
speculate on the moral and ethical justifications of the phenomenon, while legal theories weigh 
up the rights of peoples to self-determination against the preservation of the territorial integrity 
of states based on a variety of legal documents such as constitutional laws and Resolutions from 
the United Nations. 
 
Although theoretically relevant, normative and legal approaches to secession limit the analysis of 
the phenomena to the level of ideas. A useful theory of secession must transcend the realm of 
ideas and engage germane structural factors such as the social, political and economic context in 
which secessions or attempts at secession take place. As stated by Keller (2007:3), “only in this 
way theories can provide the roadmap for understanding and even resolving intrastate conflicts 
that revolve around demands by certain groups to separate”.  
 
In line with the above, a number of explanatory theories were considered for this study: Collier 
and Hoffler‟s theory, Bartkus‟ cost/benefit approach, John Wood‟s comparative analytical 
framework and Coggins‟ international-level model of state birth. Collier and Hoffler theory of 
secession, assumes that “secessions are attempted whenever a part of the population perceives 
secession as economically advantageous” (Collier and Hoffler, 2002:2). The authors turn to the 
cases of Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea, South Sudan and Slovenia to support their views. Bartkus 
rational choice theory of secession indicates that decisions to secede are dependent on four 
primary variables: “the benefits of continued membership, the costs of secession, the costs of 
membership, and the benefits of secession” (Bartkus, 1999:18).  
 
Collier and Hoffler‟s economic theory and Bartkus rational choice approach to secession have 
proved inadequate to address the research questions of this investigation: the former because of 
its failure to account for cases where secessions were (or are) not economically beneficial (such 
as Macedonia, Montenegro, the Basque country), as well as the theory‟s narrow focus on a single 
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determinant to account for a complex phenomenon such as secession; the latter because of its 





Therefore, this research is informed by a combination of two analytical tools: Wood‟s 
comparative framework on secession and Coggins‟ international-level model of state birth. The 
former examines the internal dynamics of secession – from inception to attainement of 
statehood; while the latter explores the politics of external recognition of secessionist movements 
and their subsequent admission into the international community of states.  
 
1.5.1 Wood’s Comparative Analytical Framework on Secession 
 
Wood‟s analytical framework investigages secession as a social and political phenomenon. The 
model examines secession as a dynamic process occurring in five stages: “the preconditions of 
secession, the rise of secessionist movements, the response of central governments, the direct 
precipitants of secession and the resolution of secessionist crises by armed conflict” 
(Wood,1980:109).  
 
1. Preconditions of secessions: Wood believes that secessions or attempts at secession do not 
happen accidentally; rather, a number of preconditions are necessary for the emergence of a 
group‟s alienation from the central government and the development of secessionist impulses 
(1980:12). These factors are of geographical, social, political, economic and psychological 
nature. In other words, in order for a secessionist process to begin there must be: a separable 
territory containing the potentially secessionist population; a degree of solidarity among the 
group based on ethnic ties, common culture or other aggregative elements; a pattern of changing 
access to benefits (the group‟s perceptions or anticipation of denial of its “rightful” share); a 
decline in the legitimacy or politically integrative capacity of the central government; and the 
perception or anticipation of threat to the group‟s identity and security (1980:122).  
 
2. The rise of secessionist movements: is premised on three dominant elements: ideology, 
leadership and organization. Wood believes that in general, secessionists subscribe to some form 
of nationalism. They frame it to articulate the group‟s grievances and the message that their 
interests will be better served in a new nation-state. Leaders play a central role in this process as 
                                                 
1
 As it will be explained later, this research favors the qualitative methodological approach. 
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they are tasked with the mobilization of the group, definition of strategies, creating the picture of 
the nation to be created and the initiation of an “outbidding contest with the central government 
and with loyalist representatives of their region” (1980:123). These efforts are consolidated in 
the formation of secessionist organizations reflecting coordinated structures of command. 
 
3. The response of Central Governments: Wood (1980:125) believes that the effectiveness of 
the central government‟s response can conclusively determine the outcome of secessionist 
challenges. In this context, the central government is faced with two options: the suppression of 
secessionists through coercive means including assimilation or accommodation through 
constitutional and political reforms. According to Wood constitutional reforms such as 
redrawing internal boundaries can undermine secessionist challenges while acknowledging 
plural division. In addition, political reforms including devolutionary arrangements within 
unitary states and the decentralization of legislatures in federations can eliminate secessionist 
demands (1980:126). Nevertheless, Wood (1980:127) states that, “the outcome of a secessionist 
attempt depends on the central government‟s ability to assert or recreate its legitimacy as the 
ruler of all of its territorial components, and on its will to use all of the authority implied by that 
legitimacy”. 
 
4. The precipitants of Secession: these are actions or events that lead secessionists to declare or 
implement their pro-independence agenda and the central government‟s reaction to militarily 
suppress them. In Wood‟s views, these actions and events are usually “constructed as a direct 
threat to the security of either side” (1980:128). For the secessionists it might be the fear of 
cultural assimilation while for the central government is the loss of territory perceived as a threat 
to the state. Wood (1980:129) concludes that “it is easy to identify precipitants of secession after 
the fact and risky to predict them in advance”.  
 
5. The resolution of secessionist crises by armed conflict: Wood (1980:129) observes that few 
secessionist struggles develop into an all-out war as they are usually settled through peaceful 
means, neutralized by central government repression or simply lose their initial strength. 
However, in case of warfare, two factors can influence decisively on the outcome:  the strategic 
and tactical advantage of the belligerents and external involvement. Guerrilla warfare is the norm 
in most secessionist struggles. The central government has to fight the entire civilian population 
in the secessionist region often leading to large casualties, charges of genocide and refugee 
movements (1980:130). These elements attract outside involvement in the internal war. External 
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involvement in secessionist struggles can take many forms; and this involvement influences the 
outcome of the conflict in multiple ways. Moreover, Wood notes that, if the internal 
preconditions to secession are present external support to the government will not maintain the 
status quo for very long. If they are lacking external assistance to the secessionists will not 
improve the likelihood of a successful secession (1980:132).  
 
Finally, Wood (1980:133) concludes that “a „successful‟ secession is complete when it becomes 
institutionalized in a new government, legitimate at home and recognized abroad”.  
 
1.5.2 Coggins’ International-Level Model of State Birth 
 
This model asserts that international politics determines the recognition and birth of new states. 
Coggins (2011:448) argues that since the international system of states functions like a 
community or social group, “it is the mutual exchange of sovereignty that constitutes 
membership, not effective, domestic level authority. As such, secessionists only accede to 




 play a decisive role in this process because of their material strength and 
influence on other member states. In line with the aforementioned, Coggins (2011:449) 
elaborates, “when the Great Powers agree, their decision serves as a focal point that initiates a 
cascade of legitimacy throughout the system‟s remaining members”. Furthermore, Coggins 
discusses three broad categories of self-interested reasons that can influence a states‟ motivation 
concerning the recognition of new members. They are informed by international politics and 
include: external security, domestic insecurity, and coordination. 
 
The pursuit of external security is a driving force for recognition because of state‟s compulsion 
to survive: “state leaders weigh any potential grant of legitimacy with reference to their own 
security situations, judging how each new member will positively or negatively affect them” 
(Coggins, 2011:449). Domestic insecurity too affects recognition behavior, as states facing 
internal challenges would not like to encourage secessionist movements within their borders. 
Lastly, Great Powers‟ coordinated recognition is necessary whenever possible as failure to do so 
results in international instability and the preservation of the status quo. 
                                                 
2
 - The leading political, economic and military states in the international system such as the veto holding 






1.6 Research Methodology and Methods 
 
This research privileges the qualitative research approach. Qualitative research can, broadly, be 
defined as the use of “words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data” 
(Bryman, 2013:380). Qualitative research is also used to describe any study whose findings are 
not the result of statistical processes or other quantitative means (Strauss & Corbin, 1990:17).  
The study espouses the interpretative epistemological paradigm, which assumes that the social 
world is the outcome of the examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants 
(Bryman, 2013:381) and, as such, there is no separation between social phenomena and those 
involved in its construction. Social reality is not something out there, waiting to be discovered, 
but something that is constructed through inter-personal and group interactions.  
 
The process of data collection involved the scrutiny of existing relevant studies that capture the 
dynamics of secession in Africa.  Particular attention is given to the cases of Eritrea and South 
Sudan to illustrate the role of both domestic and external factors in determining the successful 
outcome of secessionist movements on the continent. In this regard, secondary data was gathered 
from various sources such as books, reports, peer-reviewed articles, online journal articles as 
well as published and un-published theses.  
 
It should be noted that the use of data gathered from secondary sources does not reduce the 
quality of the study in relation to primary data source research. Secondary data collection 
includes benefits such as “savings: in terms of resources, time, money and personnel; increased 
data quality; larger sample size; and intellectual advancement” (Davine, 2003:286). Hence, the 
re-analysis of existing data for the purposes of answering new research questions is significant 
because it has the potential of creating new meaning and develop empirical knowledge in the 
process.  
  
In addition, the study undertook a textual analysis of data gathered from the aforementioned 
sources. Illustration was the favored method as it is grounded on the re-evaluation and 
interpretation of existing data in order to exemplify, explain and elucidate propositions. This 
technique is consistent with social research interpretative epistemology which argues that social 
phenomena is not separated from those involved in its construction; and social research 
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constructive ontology which argues that human understanding of the social world is the outcome 
of the examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants (Bryman, 2013:380). 
1.7 Significance of the Research 
 
This research is of relevance given the prevalence of secessionist activities in the contemporary 
world. Secession is a global phenomenon affecting both developed and developing societies. The 
African continent, in particular, is still home to a number of separatist movements including 
Casamance (Senegal), Cabinda (Angola), Zanzibar (Tanzania), Ogaden (Ethiopia), Western 
Sahara (Morocco) and Somaliland (Somalia) (McNamee, 2012:14). An investigation into the 
determinants of secession in Eritrea and South Sudan will help scholars, policy-makers and 
commentators to understand the impacts of domestic and international politics in the creation of 
new states in post-colonial Africa. 
 
1.8 Structure of the Dissertation  
 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides the necessary 
background information to the study such as the research problem, questions and objectives of 
the study, the theoretical framework and the methodological approach to the research. The 
second chapter reviews the existing literature on the phenomenon of secession with particular 
emphasis on the definitional problem, historical manifestations of the phenomenon, academic 
approaches and the secessionist debate in Africa. The third chapter analyses the process of 
secession in Eritrea looking at the territory‟s political geography and history, federation with 
Ethiopia, Ethiopia‟s annexation of Eritrea, the liberation wars and attainment of statehood. The 
fourth chapter describes the dynamics of South Sudan‟s long walk to independence, the uneasy 
relationship between North and South, the civil wars, and the settlement of the conflict through 
the CPA. The last chapter sets out the summary, conclusions and lessons that can be drawn from 
the experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan regarding the explanation of the determining factors 







2.1 Introduction  
 
Secession is a contemporary political phenomenon (Beary, 2008:31). Although the term is often 
associated with negative and disapproving connotations, the post-Cold War period has witnessed 
renewed scholarly interest on the subject as a process of state creation (Anderson, 2013:343). 
Secession has both an interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary character leading to 
complementary academic approaches, as social scientists, legal scholars and philosophers have 
examined it through the lenses of their respective disciplines (Siroty, 2007:45).  
 
In this regard, this chapter provides a review of available literature on the phenomenon of 
secession with the view of identifying and clarifying the main discourses surrounding the 
subject. The chapter will focus on the concept, historical overview, dynamics, theories and 
practices of secession around the world, with particular consideration to its manifestations and 
discourses on the African continent. 
 
2.2 Secession: A Contested Concept 
 
The word secession has contested meanings (Doyle, 2010:1). Pavikovic and Radan (2007:4) 
validate this view observing that “there is little consensus amongst scholars on the definition of 
secession”. This conceptual divergence means that there is no generally accepted criteria to 
determine if a case of state creation is or not the result of secession. However, different 
definitions of the phenomenon share the common assumption that “secession is synonymous 
with moving apart or withdrawing” (Anderson, 2013:345). This notion emanates from the 
etymology of the word, the Latin verb secede, with “„se‟ meaning „apart‟ and „cedere‟ meaning 
„to go‟” (Pavikovic & Radan, 2007:5).    
 
A number of scholars have offered various definitions of secession. For instance, Crawford 
(1979:247) defines it as “the creation of a state by the use or threat of force and without the 
consent of the former sovereign”. According to Bartkus (1999:3) the concept denotes “the formal 
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withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a 
new state”. Kohen (2006:1) views secession as “the creation of a new independent state entity 
through the separation of part of the territory and population of an existing state”. In the words of 
Pavikovic and Radan (2007:1) secession is “a process of withdrawal of a territory and its 
population from an existing state and the creation of a new state on that territory”; while 
Anderson (2013:344) describes secession as “the withdrawal of territory (colonial or non-
colonial) from part of an existing state to create a new state”. 
 
Although the aforementioned definitions convey the idea of creating new states out of existing 
ones, there are some discernible differences between them. For instance, in his definition, 
Anderson (2013:344) includes all cases of state formation resulting from the decolonization 
process. According to this view, the vast majority of former colonies in Africa and Asia would 
be considered cases of secession. Crawford (1979:247) sets the limits of secession on the use or 
threat of force by the secessionists, and opposition of the parent state. Crawford‟s (1979:247) 
definition reduces secession to a few cases such as Bangladesh (Pavikovic & Radan, 2011:3). 
For Bartkus (1999:3), Kohen (2006:1), and Pavikovic and Radan (2007:1), secession includes 
only states formed outside the colonial context, with Bartkus stressing the role of recognition by 
other states as a criterion for statehood.  
 
These definitional differences are driven by the scope of the proposed definitions. In this regard, 
Kohen (2006:2) argues that definitions of secession can be categorized into broad and narrow 
conceptions. Pavikovic and Radan (2011:3) use the same terminology. Broad notions of 
secession consider all cases of state emergence including through the processes of 
decolonization; while narrow definitions of secession refer only to the processes of separating a 
non-colonial territory from an internationally recognized sovereign state in order to create a new 
independent state.  
 
Anderson (2013:350) notes that secession can be consensual (occurs when the parent state 
consents to the withdrawal of the secessionist region) and unilateral (occurs without the parent 






2.3 Brief Historical Overview of Secession 
 
History has registered several events that can be termed secession. In the words of Coggins 
(2011:24), “as long as political communities have existed, discontented minorities within them 
have attempted to break away”. In fact, as early as 479 BCE the Ionians pleaded with the Greeks 
to help them escape from the authority of the Persian Empire. In medieval Europe, dissatisfied 
communities “sought to extricate themselves from kingdoms, feudal domains and churches” 
(Beary, 2008:39). However, secession, as a modern phenomenon, is a predicament that dates 
back to the emergence of the interstate system with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 (Coggins, 2011:24). 
 
Bridget Coggins has provided the most comprehensive attempt at charting historical changes in 
secessionism. She observes that, although there are no reliable records of secessionist demands 
during the 18
th
 century, “the American colonies‟ declaration of independence was a harbinger of 
secessionist demands to come” (Coggins, 2011:26).  
 
Secession was a rare occurrence over the course of the 19
th
 century with the exceptions of 
developments in the Americas. Colonies in the New World won successful wars of independence 
from their European metropolises, especially Spain, resulting in the creation of new states such 
as Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, etc. (Coggins, 2011:27). 
Kohen (2006:1) argues that this process took the form of secession as “the idea of – and 
consequently, the term – „decolonization‟ did not exist during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries”.  Similarly, in 1865, a group of 11 Southern states forming the Confederate States of 
America were forcibly reintegrated into the United States after a failed attempt to secede from 
the Union (Beary, 2008:39). Incidentally, Coggins (2011:27) observes that “between 1816 and 





 century saw membership in the international system of states more than triple. 
According to Beary (2008:41), the number of states has grown from “the approximately 55 that 
existed in 1900 to the 192 that make up the United Nations today”.  In the words of Coggins 
(2014:5), 
 
These new states were born in various ways over four periods of independence. 
The first two occurred after the world wars, as victors punished vanquished and 
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rewarded their friends. The third occurred more gradually as empires shed their 
colonial holdings from the end of World War II through the 1970s. Finally, the 
Yugoslav and Soviet collapses created more than 20 new states from just two as 
the century concludes.     
 
During this period, “the percentage of states born as a result of secession approached 70 percent. 
In the last 50 years it grew to 73 percent, making secession an increasing common cause of state 
birth” (Coggins, 2011:28). The majority of demands for secession in the 20th century were anti-
colonial and resulted from colonial peoples‟ exposure to the ideas of self-determination and 
nationalism in Africa and Asia.  
 
Presently, “secession seems to plague all types of societies – liberal democratic, former 
communist, and developing” (Bartkus, 1999:3). Without a doubt, in the recent past, conflicts in 
South Sudan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Basque Country, Tibet, the Philippines, Northern 
Cyprus, Quebec, etc., have all been linked to aspirations for independent statehood.  
 
2.4 The Dynamics of Secession  
 
Heraclides (1991:1) argues that secession is “a special kind of territorial disintegration involving 
states”. It arises when sub-state ethno-cultural communities frustrated in their quest for 
recognition and resources, challenge the state and its territorial definition through the pursuit of 
independent statehood (Premdas, 2013:2). Territorial fragmentation of the state is a threat against 
the very definition of the state; as a result, central governments often attempt to militarily subdue 
separatist groups (Pavikovic & Radan, 2011:1). 
 
As stated by Beary (2008:1), “frequently, separatist struggles are prolonged, punishing, and 
prohibitively costly and are fought with fanatical intensity and uncompromising stubbornness 
involving high civilian casualties”. In this regard, Premdas (2013:5) has observed how “few are 
the cases if any where the parties are not joined in their struggle by foreign interests or states 
with their own agenda more often than not adding fuel to the sustenance of the struggle”. Beary 
(2008:38) supports this view noting that “separatist movements are frequently manipulated by 






Horowitz (1985:230) clarifies,  
 
Whether and when a secessionist movement will emerge is determined mainly 
by domestic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state. 
Whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however is determined 
largely by international politics, the balance of interests and forces that extend 
beyond the state. 
 
Secession is a process directed towards attainment of independence as its outcome. In this 
regard, Kohen (2006:14) explains that, “secession is not an instant fact. It always implies a 
complex series of claims and decisions, negotiations and/or struggle, which may – or may not – 
lead to the creation of a new state”. Reasoning along the same lines, Premdas (2013:4) argues, 
“as a social process, secession may be conceived analytically as constituted of steps and stages, 
cumulative and precipitating causes, periodically displaying patterns of accommodation and 
intransigence”.  
 
Secession is closely associated with recognition. According to Wood (1980:133), a “‟successful‟ 
secession is not complete until it has become institutionalized in a new government, legitimate at 
home and recognized abroad”. Pavikovic and Radan (2007:10) support this view noting that 
once a territory breaks off from its parent state, recognition by other states completes the process 
of achieving statehood. In other words, an entity is treated as a state only if the outside world 
recognizes it to be one (Sterio, 2009:8). In this regard, Dugard and Raic (2006:94) have argued 
that “recognition has provided the imprimatur of statehood to seceding entities for over two 
hundred years”.  
 
Malone (2008:42) notes that recognition covers “a confusing mixture of international law, 
domestic law, and politics”. The author elaborates further observing that “recognition is the 
willingness to deal with another state or government representing the state as a member of the 
international community”. Ker-Lindsay asserts that although recognition may take various forms 
(recognition of governments, insurgencies and states), strictly speaking, it refers to the practice 
of states only (Ker-Lindsay, 2012:6), and it is generally informed by political considerations 
(Ker-Lindsay, 2012:7).  
 
The significance of recognition in determining the actual status of secessionist territories has 
been the object of a long-running debate between legal scholars. There are two major views on 
the matter: the constitutive and the declaratory schools of thought (Sterio, 2009:10). Under the 
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constitutive view, acts of recognition define statehood: “an entity does not exist as a state until it 
has been recognized by other states. The recognition itself „constitutes‟ the state” (Malone, 
2008:44). The declaratory theory holds the view that a state‟s existence does not hinge on 
recognition or non-recognition but on the fulfillment of the fact of statehood (defined territory, 
permanent population and effective government (Ker-Lindsay, 2012:16). Anderson (2013:355) 
has identified a third school of thought, the constitutive-collective recognition theory, which 
submits that “collective recognition by international organizations is a sine qua non for 
statehood”. 
 
2.5 Normative and Legal Approaches to Secession  
 
The secession debate has often been structured along normative lines. As clarified by Bartkus 
(1999:15), “moral questions lie at the very core of any secession”. A question often arises from 
secessionist attempts: what arguments justify a plea for secession?  
 
In several instances, political theorists have identified “political norms and/or ethical norms 
which would best justify the creation of a new state out of an established one” (Pavikovic & 
Radan, 2007:200). Buchanan (1997:31) argues that “all theories of the right to secede either 
understand the right as a remedial right only or also recognize a primary right to secede”. Some 
authors like Pavikovic and Radan (2007:201) use a different terminology: remedial theories and 
choice theories. Remedial theories are highly restrictive, stressing that “a group has a general 
right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the 
appropriate remedy or last resort” (Buchanan, 1997:31). Choice theories of secession are more 
permissive maintaining that “the state is a voluntary association into which citizens and groups 
of citizens can enter and from which they can exit by their own choice” (Pavikovic & Radan, 
2007:201). 
 
Likewise, discourses on secession have also been assessed from a legal perspective. For 
example, Pavikovic and Radan (2007:221) explain that the legality or lawfulness of secession 
“can be examined from the context of a state‟s constitutional law and international law”. 
Secessionists may exercise the right to secession under a state‟s law provided that “it is 
consented to, first, by the population of the territorial entity that seeks to secede, and second, the 
host state as a whole” (Radan, 2011:333). In relation to the first, consent may be determined by 
referendum, while the second entails the adoption of an appropriate constitutional amendment. 
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These procedures have been observed in the cases of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the 
Yugoslavian Federation and Ethiopia (Radan, 2011:333). 
 
In terms of international norms, Crawford (1979:390) argues that “secession is neither legal nor 
illegal under international law, but a legally neutral fact the consequences of which is or may be 
regulated internationally”. Other scholars, however, do not accept this approach, arguing instead 
that “there exists a limited or qualified right of secession in international law that stems from the 
rights of peoples to self-determination” (Pavikovic & Radan, 2007:233). Radan (2011:301), for 
instance, argues that “an implicit, but limited, right of unilateral secession exists pursuant to the 
right of peoples to self-determination, such a right is said to arise if a territory community within 
a state is systematically discriminated against”. However, it must be noted that “even if secession 
is illegal it may be effective if the seceding entity is recognized as a state by the international 
community” (Pavikovic & Radan, 2007:221). 
 
2.6 The Secessionist Debate in Africa 
 
Secession is not a novel occurrence in the African political arena (Ylonen, 2013:130). As stated 
by Christopher (2011:1) “the continent of Africa has been wracked with conflict and secessionist 
movements since independence”. In effect, as early as 1960, provincial authorities in Katanga 
attempted to break away from the newly independent Republic of Congo (Bereketeab, 2012:10). 
In the same way, Biafra declared its independence from the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 1967 
on the grounds of distinctive identity (Keller, 2007:3). However, these early secessionist 
attempts in the nascent independent Africa did not succeed as they were decisively crushed by 
the military of their respective central governments (Bamfo, 2013:2). 
 
It is worth mentioning that there were no major secessionist conflicts in Africa between 1970 and 
1991. Sudan and Ethiopia were the lone exceptions (Engelbert & Hummel, 2005:422). As 
explained by Njoku (2010:348) this interlude in African secessionism may be attributed to “the 
UN/OAU anti-secessionist policies in Africa, which successfully isolated both Katanga and 
Biafra…and the international politics of the Cold War era, which discouraged other secessionist 
agitations, although it did not make Africa less volatile”.  
 
The disintegration of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) in 1990-1991 reignited the 
flames of secessionist struggles in Africa (Engelbert & Hummel 2005:421). At present there are 
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several secessionist conflicts underway in the continent, including Casamance (Senegal), 
Cabinda (Angola), Zanzibar (Tanzania), Ogaden (Ethiopia), Western Sahara (Morocco) and 
Somaliland (Somalia) (McNamee, 2012:14). 
 
The debate on secessionism in Africa can be divided into five broad categories: causes, 
secessionist deficit, right of secession, the determinants of secessions in South Sudan and its 
impacts on other secessionist movements in the continent.  
 
2.6.1 Causal Factors of Secession in Africa 
 
There are two distinct views on the causal factors of secession in post-colonial Africa: the legacy 
of the inherited colonial borders (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga 2013; Ouguergouz & 
Tehindrazanarivelo 2006; Engelbert et al. 2002; Herbst 1989; Griffiths 1986), and failures of 
governance (Whitehead 2014; Ndulo 2013; Bamfo 2012 and Keller 2010).  
 
Proponents of the character of African borders‟ position, such as Ouguergouz and 
Tehindrazanarivelo (2006:258), argue that “it is almost impossible to examine the problematic of 
the state in Africa without making reference to the artificial and arbitrary character of African 
borders”. Herbst (1989:693) clarifies: “boundaries in Africa are often characterized as artificial 
and arbitrary on the basis of the fact that they do not respond to what people believe to be 
rational demographic, ethnographic, and topographic boundaries”. Despite their artificial and 
arbitrary character, African borders have remained virtually unchanged since 1884, when they 
were first demarcated by European colonial powers at the Berlin conference. 
 
In this regard, Njoku (2010:339) suggests that there are two major arguments in the discussion 
on the subject of borders in post-colonial Africa. The first group contends that, “the post-colonial 
state should be adjusted in order to create homogeneous communities that can live in peace” 
(Njoku, 2010:339); while the second group upholds the inviolable character of inherited colonial 
borders as agreed upon by the African leaders at the OAU summit in Cairo in 1964 (Keller, 
2007:1). 
 
Some scholars, such as Engelbert et al. (2002), Hughes (2010), Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 
(2010) and others collectively suggest that African borders should be “de-colonized”. For 




The fact that state borders on the African continent were and are artificial is not 
unique to Africa, but what is problematic is their arbitrariness which has an 
impact on issues of nation building and identity politics. Artificiality and 
arbitrariness of borders must not be conflated into one problem. Arbitrariness 
more than artificiality of African boundaries, has had serious consequences for 
politics of identity, character of conflicts and the project of nation building.  
 
This argument is supported by Engelbert et al. (2002:1903) who maintains that “evidence 
appears to support claims that Africa has paid a substantial price for refusing to challenge some 
of the arbitrary borders it inherited from colonialism”. In effect, the African continent has paid 
the price of failure to decolonize its borders in terms of interstate disputes, civil wars and 
political instability and secessionist conflicts (Engelbert et al., 2002:1118). 
 
Notwithstanding, the advocates of the sacrosanct character of African borders often criticize the 
aforementioned view. The view mirrors the position of the OAU and its successor the AU. It 
dates back to the founding charter of the OAU in 1963 when member states pledged, “respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state” (Griffiths, 1986:213). This commitment 
was reaffirmed at the OAU summit in Cairo in 1964 when African heads of state observed that 
“considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension ... all 
Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of 
national independence” (Griffiths, 1986:213). In a similar fashion, Sturman (2008:68) elaborates, 
“the new norms of the AU do not include a revision of uti possidetis”. Herbst (1989:692) 
provides the rationale for this view arguing that “the vast majority of borders have remained 
virtually untouched since that time because the system for the most part continues to serve the 
political needs of the colonialists and present-day African leaders”. 
 
Another group of scholars have made the case for poor governance as the causal factor of 
secessionist attempts in Africa. For example, Ylonen (2013:131) suggests that dynamics of 
marginalization lead groups to challenge the state. This view is supported by Ndulo (2013) who 
argues that “failure of governance leads minority groups to believe that they are not included in 
running the affairs of the state”. According to Katz (1995:183) “this frustration often leads to 
mobilization under ethnic or territory-based identity with the belief that the group‟s rights would 
be adequately protected in a self-governed territory”. Arguing from a similar perspective, Bamfo 
(2012:37) indicates that ideological and policy differences between a region or ethnic group and 
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the central government might lead to the emergence of separatist sentiment which might or 
might not develop into a secessionist war.  
 
Ylonen (2013:131) sums up this view stating that,   
 
in order to understand demands for self-determination it is useful to examine 
them in the context of state marginalization that is particularly prevalent among 
those states with colonial past in Africa, which have continued to be highly 
exclusive and suffer from challenges related to the lack of legitimacy among 
sectors of the population”    
 
 
2.6.2 The Right to Secession in Africa  
 
There is also an ongoing debate on the state of the African legal order on the rights of people to 
secession. International law recognizes both the right to self-determination and the right of a 
state to its territorial integrity. Mnyongani (2008:464) argues that the tension between the two 
rights has been the cause of many wars in post-colonial Africa where “struggles continue to be 
waged under the banner of self-determination and these have been thwarted with reference to the 
right of a state to its territorial integrity”. As previously mentioned, the OAU and its successor 
the African Union do not recognize, as a matter of principle, a right to secession to any African 
people.  
 
However, Cowell (2013:25) claims that the African Union has “shifted from the Organisation of 
African Unity‟s (OAU) practice of defending state sovereignty at all costs, to a more value-
driven approach regarding the recognition of secessionist states”. Sturman (2008:68) is of 
different opinion arguing that “the AU has made its instance on secession more legally binding 
than it was under the OAU Charter”.  Ouguergouz and Tehindrazanarivelo (2006:257) argues 
that the African Charter on Peoples and Human Rights offers potentialities for a right to 
secession, especially in cases where a people is denied the opportunity to enjoy its right to 
internal self-determination as illustrated by the experience of South Sudan.  
 
2.6.3 The Secessionist Deficit Argument 
 
A different group of studies has explored another dimension of the phenomenon of secession in 
Africa by focusing on the continent‟s secessionist deficit. Engelbert and Hummel (2005: 399) 
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remark that “over the last 40 years, Africa has experienced relatively fewer secessionist conflicts 
than most other regions of the world, even though it is otherwise plagued with political violence 
and its countries tend to display a higher prevalence of many of the factors usually associated 
with separatism”. This raises the question: what factors explain the relative scarcity of 
secessionist conflicts in Africa? 
 
Baker‟s (2001:65) argument that secessionist leaders‟ shifting political objectives as well as the 
nature of calculations behind those changes are informed by a number of factors including 
“popular support, state response, international response and personal opportunities” seem to 
provide an answer to this question. Reasoning along the same lines, Engelbert and Hummel 
(2005:412) argues that “in Africa as elsewhere, regional leaders can be expected to capitalize on 
local grievances and promote secessions if the potential rewards of a separatist state, in the 
absence of international recognition, outweigh the potential rewards associated with control or 
partial control of institutions of the sovereign national state”.  
 
Engelbert develops this argument in two other instances. First, the author illustrates it by 
comparing the cases of elite compliance in Barotseland (Zambia) and defiance in Casamance 
(Senegal), concluding that “provided they can use the post-colonial state in their local strategies 
of domination and access to resources, regional elites are unlikely to challenge it, even if they are 
kept at a distance from resource-sharing arrangements at the national level” (Engelbert 2005:29). 
Secondly, he argues that African actors‟ decisions to seek secession are constrained by two main 
factors: “the rules of internal recognition of new states (and the particular African doctrine in this 
matter) and the relatively unique nature of Africa‟s post-colonial state” (Engelbert 2014:147). 
 
In general, the international system opposes the recognition of new states through secession 
(Engelbert 2005:418). Anderson (2013:343) notes that “this situation is explicable by the fact 
that secession represents a challenge to perhaps the two most fundamental principles of 
international law: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states”. The norms of the OAU rule 
out any secessionist movement outside the colonial context. In this regard, Sturman (2008:67) 
has argued that “secession has long been regarded as the antithesis of African statehood by the 
Organization of African Union”.  
 
The African Union, the successor of the OAU, seems to maintain the status quo on secession. 
Sturman (2013:68) notes that “the reappraisal of state sovereignty by the AU does not extend as 
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far as changing the regional norm against secession”. In the same way, “the UN espouses anti-
secessionist doctrine in Africa on the grounds of respect for the principle of sovereignty and 
respect for the geographical status quo” (Njoku, 2010:340). Hence, “the failure of the OAU to 
recognize secessionist claims as legitimate claims of self-determination has almost certainly been 
a contributory factor in deterring claims of secession” (Cowell, 2013:29). 
 
However, some scholars have criticized the debate on the scarcity of secession in Africa. For 
instance, Ba (2013:79) argues that “although the argument that Africa has a secessionist deficit is 
empirically sound, it has also served as ammunition for some other scholars to call for more 
secessionism in Africa”. Ba (2013:86) further suggests that redrawing the African map does not 
offer the best solution for violent protracted conflicts in the continent, “data shows that no 
secessionist movement in Africa resulting in the creation of a new state has either resolved 
conflict or led to more stability in the country or the region”. 
 
2.6.4 The Post-South Sudan’s Secession discussions  
 
In recent years, the successful secession of South Sudan has engendered renewed academic 
interest on Africa‟s latent and active secessionist movements. A number of studies have explored 
the determinants of Southern secession in the Sudan while others have focused on the impacts of 
South Sudan‟s experience on other nationalist movements in the continent. 
 
A group of scholars have argued that South Sudan‟s secession has not led to a domino effect on 
other secessionist movements in the Africa. Writing in 2011, Tull (2011:1) commented that, 
 
at present, there is no evidence to suggest that other governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa, likewise confronted with demands of separatist movements, will acquiesce 
to the partitioning of their state in order to end an irredentist conflict. Likewise, no 
secessionist movement currently exists in Africa, which could muster enough 
military power to force the central state to agree to separation.   
 
In a similar fashion, McNamee (2012:7) argues that Africa‟s borders are likely to remain 
unchanged after Sudan‟s historic split partly because of “the values instilled in the continent‟s 
founding political structures, namely the Organization of African Unity (OAU)”; the position of 
the international community, which shows “predilection for the status quo”; and finally, “the 




Although in agreement with other scholars concerning the tangible effects of South Sudan‟s 
secession on Africa‟s secessionist activities, Engelbert (2014:1) points out that “there is a 
significant rise in the coincidence of separatist and Islamist insurgencies”. He further suggests 
that “Islamism might represent a more radical challenge to the postcolonial territorial state in 
Africa than most other instances of secessionism to date” (Engelbert, 2014:1).  
 
The fact that Southern insurgents in the Sudan achieved their political objective – independence 
– in the absence of a military victory against the government of Sudan started an intense debate 
in the literature regarding the determinants of the secession of South Sudan. The discussion has 
been succinctly framed in the following terms: what factors better explain the partition of the 
Sudan?  
 
Several reasons have been put forward to account for this fact. Daoud (2012:1), for example, has 
argued that Southern Sudan‟s secession is the result of multiple factors including “the impact of 
the centre‟s policies, the weakness of the democratic governments, the failure of the peace 
processes, the existence of historical grievances, and the role of international actors”. From a 
similar perspective, Taha (2011) explains that the unity of the southern rebellion movement, the 
South‟s strategic demand for secession and regional and international support for the South 
represent the three determinant factors for the secession of South Sudan. 
 
A number of scholars have suggested that external factors played a decisive role in the secession 
of South Sudan. This argument is supported by Mamdani (2011) who claims that “in the case of 
South Sudan, the external factor was more decisive. That external factor was the 9/11 and, 
following it, US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq”. This view has also been complemented by 
Medani (2012:290) who asserts that “the U.S.-led compromise agreement between essentially 
two elite factions in northern and southern Sudan played a crucial role in preventing the 
reorganization of a unified Sudanese state”. Milena Sterio (2013:161) elaborates, “the great 
powers were instrumental in ensuring that South Sudan remained a part of Sudan, and then over 
the last decade, the great powers played a dominant role in paving the south Sudanese way 
toward independence”.  
 
Others have evaluated this view advocating instead that domestic factors played the decisive role 
in determining the break-up of the Sudan. In particular, Huliaras (2012:21) contends that “while 
both domestic and external factors explain the largely unanticipated outcome, domestic factors 
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were far more important than external ones”. This is in agreement with Salman (2013:345) who 
contends that “the secession of South Sudan ensued from the failure of Northern Sudanese 
Political leaders to deal with South Sudan‟s social, political, economic, and cultural differences 
seriously”. The failure of the central government to make the “unity of Sudan” attractive to the 
people of Southern Sudan in the interim period contributed to the massive vote in favor of 




This chapter has surveyed the main themes in the available literature on the phenomenon of 
secession. The chapter has explored the different definitions of secession, the history, dynamics 
and approaches to the phenomenon as a well as the state of the secessionist debate on the African 
continent. The chapter reveals that secession is a contested concept, it is not a 20
th
 century 
development and can be approached through the lenses of several disciplines such as philosophy 
and law. 
 
The review highlights the fact that studies on secessionism in Africa focus mostly on the causes 
of the phenomenon, its legal status, scarcity, and on the impacts of the recent case of South 
Sudan on African secessionist discourse. Although, a number of works acknowledge the 
existence of many secessionist groups in post-colonial Africa, including the successful cases of 
Eritrea and South Sudan, few have attempted to explain what determines the successful outcome 
of secessionist movements on the continent. 
 
Building on the reviewed literature, this study investigates the determinants of secession in post-
colonial Africa. This objective will be achieved by analyzing the dynamics of secession in 
Eritrea and South Sudan. Without any pretensions to establish theoretical causal relationships 
between variables and generalize them to the entire continent, the following lines will investigate 
factors that have evolved out of the particular experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan in order to 










Eritrea became independent on May 24, 1993. Eritrea attained statehood by formally 
withdrawing from Ethiopia. The event represents an extraordinary development in post-colonial 
Africa because it was the first time that a territorial unit within an existing state successfully 
separated to become a state. Although there had been previous secessionist attempts in Biafra, 
Katanga, Cabinda, Casamance, etc., these cases never succeeded as they were crushed by the 
military of their respective central governments.  
 
Thus, this chapter endeavors to explain how and why Eritrea successfully separated from 
Ethiopia. The chapter achieves this goal by analyzing the dynamics of secession in Eritrea 
through the lenses of the theoretical assumptions of Wood and Coggins‟ analytical frameworks 
on secession. The chapter investigates: the history and geography of Eritrea; the genesis of 
secessionist alienation; the emergence of secessionist movements; the Eritrean armed 
secessionist conflict; and the decisive factors for Eritrea‟s successful secession. 
 
3.2 Political Geography and History of Eritrea 
 
Wood‟s analytical framework on secession asserts that a series of preconditions must be in place 
before a secession process can initiate (Woods 1980:112). The first requirement relates to 
geographical and demographical considerations as every secession presupposes the existence of 
a territory containing the potentially secessionist population. In this regard, a comprehensive 
investigation on the determinants of Eritrea‟s successful secession must start with an exploration 
of the region‟s location, its people and their history. 
 
Eritrea is situated along the west coast of the Red Sea, north of the Horn of Africa
3
. The Italians 
named the territory in 1890 after the Roman Erythraeum Mare, literally meaning “red sea” 
(Fegley 1995: xv). Eritrea is relatively small compared to other African countries, bordering the 
Sudan on the north and northwest, Ethiopia on the South and Djibouti on the southeast.  
                                                 
3
 See maps at appendices 1 and 2 
25 
 
Although Eritrea has a population of approximately 4.5 million, the country is said to be 
inhabited by a “mosaic of diverse communities” (Sherman, 1980:3).  
 
There are nine ethno-linguistic groups in Eritrea consisting of the Afar, Bilen, Hedareb, Kunama, 
Nara, Rashaida, Saho, Tigre and Tigrinya. The last two constitute the major ethno-linguistic 
groups in the country. Tigre-speaking Eritreans are mostly Muslims and agro-pastoralists 
inhabiting the eastern and western lowlands (Mussie, 2011:18). Tigrinya-speaking Eritreans are 
generally Christians and share ethnic ties with Tigrinya-speaking communities in Ethiopia. They 
occupy the Eritrean plateau and northern Ethiopia (the province of Tigray)  (Mussie, 2011:18).  
 
Eritrea‟s history dates back to ancient times. The first recorded allusion to Eritrea was made by 
the Egyptians in 3000 BCE and narrates maritime commerce between the pharaohs of Egypt and 
local chiefs on the Red Sea coast of Eritrea (Sherman, 1980:4). Mussie (2011: xx) has pointed 
out that, “Eritrean history is characterized by prevalent conflicts, movements of people and 
external intervention”. Indeed, between the eighth and the twentieth centuries, Eritrea has 
successively been under the authority of Arab (Muslim) forces (eighth and fifteenth centuries), 
Ottoman Turks (sixteenth century), Khedival Egypt (second half of the nineteenth century), Italy 
(1890-1941), Britain (1941-1952) and Ethiopia (1962-1991). 
 
Eritrea emerged as a modern political entity on January 1, 1890 after Italy established the colony 
of Eritrea (Fegley 1995: xxxiii). Italian colonial rule over Eritrea lasted until 1941. During this 
period, the Italians transformed Eritrea into a settler colony introducing developments in the 
areas of public administration, medical service, agriculture, banking, manufacturing, light 
industry, road and railway system, etc. The colony experienced additional material progress after 
1933 as a result of Italy‟s war preparations against Ethiopia. Eritrea reached an advanced stage 
of industrialization with the modernization of the port of Massawa, enlargement of the road 
network, increasing urbanization and the expansion of Asmara, the capital city.  
 
Italian colonial rule over Eritrea ended in 1941 after the British-led Allied forces defeated the 
Italian army stationed in the country during the Second World War. Subsequently, Eritrea was 
controlled and administered by Britain until 1952. During the course of the war, the British 
Military Administration developed Eritrea‟s industrial complex to meet the needs of a war 
economy. However, the territory suffered an industrial lump in the immediate post-war period. 
According to Fegley (1995: xxxiii) “the British administration did little to combat the neglect 
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and decline of Eritrean industry and the continued exploitation of Eritrea‟s agricultural resources 
by Italian settlers”.  
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Italy was forced to renounce sovereignty over its 
colonies of Libya, Somaliland and Eritrea, as part of the terms of the Peace Treaty signed with 
the four major victorious powers
4
. In relation to Eritrea, the four powers failed to agree on a 
“disposal” plan as they held different views on the matter: Britain supported the partition of 
Eritrea between Sudan and Ethiopia; France was in favor of Italy‟s return as an administrative 
power; the US proposed a collective UN trusteeship for ten years followed by independence; 
while the Soviet Union preferred individual trusteeship (Iyob, 1995:63).  
 
Consequently, the fate of Eritrea was referred to the United Nations. A UN Commission, 
consisting of representatives from Norway, Burma, South Africa, Guatemala and Pakistan was 
sent to Eritrea in early 1950 to prepare a report for the UN General Assembly. The Commission 
was to consider the views of the Eritrean population, their capacity for self-government, regional 
interests of peace and security in East Africa, Ethiopia‟s claims that Eritrea be re-joined to its 
“Ethiopian motherland” and its need for an adequate access to the sea. Eventually, the 
Commission was divided in its recommendations: Burma, Norway and South Africa argued for a 
close association between Eritrea and Ethiopia; while Guatemala and Pakistan recommended full 
independence. On December 2, 1950 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to federate 
Eritrea with imperial Ethiopia and on September 11, 1952 the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie 
ratified Eritrea‟s constitution, thus establishing the Ethio-Eritrean federation (Iyob, 1995:64). 
 
3.3 The Genesis of Secessionist Alienation in Eritrea 
 
Besides, the existence of territory and a potentially secessionist population, Wood‟s analytical 
framework on secession highlights the incidence of social, economic, political and psychological 
grievances as essential elements for the development of separatist estrangement between the 
population of a region and its respective central government.  According to Wood (1980:121) 
these factors can be expressed in “a group‟s perceptions or anticipation of denial of its “rightful” 
share [of benefits]; a decline in the legitimacy or politically integrative capacity of the central 
governments; and the perception or anticipation of threat to the group‟s identity and security”.  
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The abovementioned factors played out during the period of political association between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (1952-1962). During the federation years, Ethiopia set up to dismantle 
Eritrea‟s autonomous federal status through diplomatic, military and extra-legal means. 
According to Sherman (1980:27) besides historical claims, the reasons for Addis Ababa sabotage 
of the federal arrangement were attributed to Ethiopian and pro-Ethiopian views that “Eritrean 
autonomy was infeasible and that only complete union would serve the needs of both countries”. 
 
However, before proceeding to the enumeration of Ethiopia‟s violation of Eritrea‟s federal 
autonomous status it is necessary to understand the rights and responsibilities of the two federal 
units. In this regard, Fegley (1995: xxxviii) elaborates, 
 
The UN General Assembly resolution, adopted by a vote of forty-seven to ten, 
provided that Eritrea should be linked to the Ethiopian Empire through a loose 
federal structure under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian emperor but with a 
form of internal self-government. The federal government, in the same way as 
the existing imperial government, was to control foreign and defense affairs, 
foreign and interstate commerce, transport and finance. Control over domestic 
affairs (including police, local administration, and local taxation to meet its 
own budget) was to be exercised by an elected Eritrean assembly on 
parliamentary model. The Eritrean state was to have its own administrative 
and judicial structures and a flag. 
 
According to Iyob (1995:88) during the first half of the federation period, 1952-1955, “Eritrea‟s 
façade democracy was gradually eroded by the new administration‟s collaboration with pro-
Ethiopian members of the first Assembly”. Emperor Haile Selassie declared the federal 
Ethiopian court to be the territory‟s final court of appeal on September 30, 1952, thus violating 
Articles 85 and 90 of the Eritrean Constitution. Freedom of press was abolished and pro-Eritrean 
newspapers were closed down. In July 1953, Ethiopia restricted mobility by enacting a law 
requiring all Eritrean males in urban areas to carry identity cards at all times. 
 
Iyob (1995:89) points out that after 1955 the violation of Eritrea‟s autonomous status within the 
federation became more flagrant as “intimidation, coercion, and military might now came into 
play”. In that year, outspoken members of the Eritrean Assembly began to be threatened or 
arrested for violations of federal (Ethiopian) laws. Newspapers‟ editors began to be imprisoned 
without plausible reasons. Tedla Beiru, the highest executive authority in the Eritrean 
government, resigned in July 1955, “due to excessive interference and pressure from the 
emperor‟s official representative in Eritrea” (Sherman 1980:27). The following year Amharic, 
the language of the Ethiopian ruling class was declared the official language of Eritrea removing 
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Tigre and Tigrinya from that position. A bill discarding the Eritrean flag and the adoption of the 
Ethiopian flag was passed in December 1958. A year later, the Eritrean Assembly voted to 
replace Eritrean laws by the Ethiopian penal code. In May 1960, the Eritrean Assembly changed 
its name from Eritrean government to Eritrean administration. 
 
In addition, the Ethiopian imperial regime set up to weaken Eritrea‟s economy making it 
dependent on Ethiopian production. To this end, Ethiopian officials discouraged foreign 
investment and commercial engagements in Eritrea (Mussie, 2011:62). Eritrean industries were 
forced to either close down or move their operations to Ethiopia (Keller, 2007:22). These 
policies had a serious impact on the Eritrean working class. Mussie (2011:62) states that “higher 
rates of unemployment resulted in massive migration of Eritrean workers to Sudan, the Middle 
East, and Ethiopia in search of jobs”.  
 
Formal protests or opposition to Addis Ababa‟s encroachments on Eritrea‟s federal autonomy 
were violently suppressed. For instance, in 1960 a group of students demanding the restoration 
of the Eritrean flag, seal and arms were immediately imprisoned.  
 
Finally on November 14, 1962, “with a sezeable Ethiopian army surrounding the Eritrean 
administration building where the Assembly convened” (Iyob 1995:94), Eritrean representatives 
abrogated Eritrea‟s federal autonomous status turning the territory into Ethiopia‟s fourteenth 
province. 
 
3.4 The Rise of Secessionist Movements in Eritrea 
 
Organised secessionist opposition requires the formation of secessionist movements reflecting 
coordinated structures of command. The leadership of secessionist movements capture the 
grievances of the people, articulate the vision of a new nation, and engage the central 
government diplomatically and militarily (Wood, 1980:123). In the case of Eritrea, Ethiopia‟s 
gradual erosion of the region‟s autonomy escalated Eritrean resistance. Organized Eritrean 
opposition to Ethiopian domination began in earnest in the late 1950s. Three leading movements 
carried out the resistance: the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), the Eritrean Liberation 





3.4.1 The Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) 
 
The emergence of the ELM as an organized underground resistance movement in the Eritrean 
political arena precedes the abrogation and official incorporation of Eritrea into the Ethiopian 
Empire in 1962 (Markakis, 1987:55). The movement was established in 1958 by Moslem 
Eritrean exiles in the Sudan and sought to mobilize support inside Eritrea and abroad against the 
growing erosion of the federation (Negash, 1997:148). From its inception the ELM sought to 
reconcile the Moslem-Christian divide that dominated Eritrean politics by emphasizing on a 
common Eritrean identity and a secular ideology. The ELM was successful in recruiting many 
members and spreading rapidly throughout the towns and cities of Eritrea because “the ELM‟s 
mobilization appealed to Eritreans of different ages, faiths and economic classes” (Iyob, 
1995:100).  
 
Although the initial programme of action of the ELM was the defense of Eritrea‟s autonomous 
status against Ethiopian encroachments (Mussie, 2011:63), later the movement began to 
advocate for Eritrea‟s liberation by coup d‟état (Iyob, 1995:101). To this end, “in September 
1960, the ELM leadership embarked on a strategy of infiltration into governmental structures so 
that the administration in Eritrea could eventually be overthrown by coup d‟état” (Mussie, 
2011:64). However, the coup strategy did not have the backing of exiled veteran politicians who 
saw the movement as a radical, Communist-inspired organization (Iyob, 1995:102). 
 
In July 1960, exiled Eritrean politicians in Cairo under the leadership of Idris Mohammed Adam 
founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF considered the ELM to be a potential 
rival and began to work against its progress. Markakis (1987:55) points out that the ELF 
leadership “launched a campaign of denunciation, claiming that the E.L.M. was being promoted 
by Communists and probable Ethiopian agents”. The appearance of the ELF signaled the demise 
of the ELM as the movement had to fight a two front war against Ethiopian security forces and a 
new antagonistic front. Several ELM cadres deserted to the ELF in the 1960s, and in 1970 the 
movement was disbanded (Mussie, 2011:4). 
 
3.4.2 The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 
 
Founded by exiled Eritrean politicians in Cairo in 1960, the ELF was more radical and militant 
than the ELM. The ELF emphasized armed resistance as the only alternative against Ethiopian 
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domination. To this end, the movement started Eritrea‟s armed struggle in September 1961 
(Negash, 1997:148), with a guerrilla force consisting of the notorious Hamid Idris Awate‟s 
companions and Eritrean veterans who had deserted from the Sudanese army and the Eritrean 
police (Markakis, 1987:56). 
 
In the early 1960s, the ELF leadership declared that the ELF was a Moslem organization and 
Eritrea an integral part of the Arab world. This strategy gained the ELF both material and 
ideological support from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, the Sudan and the Arab world in general (Negash, 
1997:149). During this period, the movement had no clear ideological line, espousing a 
combination of Islamic fundamentalism and fervent Marxism (Iyob, 1997:110). A more radical 
Marxist-oriented philosophy arose in the mid-1970s when young cadres returned from training 
camps in radical Arab countries, China and Cuba (1997:110). 
 
From its inception in the 1960s the ELF experienced institutional and organizational problems in 
its leadership apparatus and organizational structures. The ELF leadership started by modeling 
the organizational structure of the movement on the Algerian National Front of Liberation 
(AFLN) (Markakis, 1987:56). This approach led to the division of Eritrea into four main 
geographical zones each with its own military and political structures. The zonal divisions 
reflected the ELF‟s politics of exclusion and patronage along ethnic and religious affiliation 
(Iyob, 1997:112). In addition, a new body, the Revolutionary Command, tasked with centralizing 
administrative and military control over the regions and liaise with the Supreme Council (SC), 
the exiled leadership in Cairo, was established in the Sudan.  
 
The internal flows of the territorial system soon became evident as the decentralization of the 
zones, the lack of links between them, and the absence of a permanent central leadership in 
Eritrea turned the regions into independent fiefdoms, encouraging factionalism and the 
persistence of the corrosive Christian-Muslim schism. In 1968 a reform movement emerged 
within the ELF ranks, abolishing the zones as well as the Revolutionary command in the Sudan, 
and replacing them with an elected body based inside Eritrea known as General Command (GC) 
(Markakis, 1987:59).  
 
Problems ensued when a new body, the General Secretariat (GS), was created to replace the 
exiled Cairo-based SC. The GC refused to acknowledge the GS launching a repressive campaign 
of terror and violence against the reformists (Iyob, 1997:114). In 1970 the power struggle 
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between the new leadership and the reformists led to the emergence of three breakaway groups: 
the People‟s Liberation Front (PLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front - People‟s Liberation Front 
(ELF-PLF), and the ELF-Ubel. The ELF continued to be ripped apart by the centrifugal forces of 
ideology, ethnicity, religion and sectarianism while waging war against emerging nationalist 
groups.    
 
In September 1973, a Moslem contingent under the leadership of Ramadan Mohammed Nur and 
a Christian group led by Isayas Aferworq merged forming the Eritrean People‟s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) (Markakis, 1987:60). After seven years of factional inter-Eritrean conflict, cooperation 
and uneasy coexistence, the EPLF managed to push the ELF out of Eritrean territory into the 
Sudan, thus inaugurating EPLF supremacy in the Eritrean military arena in the early 1980s.  
 
3.4.2 The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 
 
The EPLF emerged as a breakaway group from the ELF in September 1973 under the leadership 
of Ramadan Mohammed Nur (General Secretary) and Isayas Aferworq (Deputy General 
Secretary) (Markakis, 1987:64). The group led the armed struggle to Eritrea‟s independence in 
1993.  
 
From the outset, the EPLF goal was to achieve national liberation through protracted war 
(Figley, 1995: xli). The movement emphasized on secular nationalism around a single Eritrean 
identity, thus repudiating the ELF‟s ethno-religious divide. Furthermore, the EPLF highlighted 
Eritrea‟s African identity in clear opposition to the ELF Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab aspirations 
(Iyob, 1995:124). Despite this, the group managed to attract support from Libya, Iraq and Syria 
(Figley, 1995: xli). 
 
Soon after being established, the EPLF suffered a major internal crisis springing from 
ideological differences amongst its members. First, a group called Menkaa‟e demanded radical 
reforms in the structures of the movement accusing its leadership of being petit bourgeois 
nationalists and calling for the creation of a proletarian party and the introduction of democratic 
principles within the organization (Mussie, 2011:66); Second, a group from the Akele Guzai 
province claimed ethnic discrimination as their group was not “adequately represented in the 
EPLF leadership” (Iyob, 1995:116). These demands were considered a great threat by the 
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leadership and most of their proponents (who refused to recant on their views) were summarily 
executed (Mussie, 2011:66). 
 
In terms of ideology, the EPLF started out with a “strong socialist and nationalist image” (Figley, 
1995: xli). However, Iyob (1995:123) describes the EPLF ideological stand as a “selective, 
pragmatic (even eclectic), application of Marxist philosophy adapted to the particular context of 
Eritrea‟s nationalistic liberation struggle”. During its first congress in January 1977, the EPLF‟s 
programme envisaged an “independent Eritrean state where the economy would be largely state-
owned and centrally planned” (Markakis, 1987:84). Tigre and Tigrinya were adopted as the 
official languages of the movement and secular education promoted (1987:84). 
 
The EPLF started out attracting large number of recruits especially among the urban, intellectual 
and Christian youth (Figley, 1995: xli) and two years after its foundation it had approximately 10 
thousand fighters in the field. Mussie (2011:66) observes that the EPLF encouraged women to 
join the organization and by 1991 women constituted one-third of the EPLF army. The EPLF 
proved to be an effective military force attacking the Ethiopian army throughout Eritrea.  
 
The EPLF managed to establish political and military alliances with two Ethiopian movements: 
the Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the Tigrean People‟s Liberation Front 
(TPLF). In the words of Mussie (2011:66) “the cooperation between the EPLF and the TPLF 
played a pivotal role in defeating the Ethiopian army”.   
 
3.5 The Eritrean Secessionist Struggle  
 
Wood (1980:129) observes that failures to settle secessionist grievances through peaceful means 
coupled with the secessionists relative strength often results in an all-out war. The warrying 
parties are often joined by foreign powers moved by different interests and agendas, thus 
influencing the outcome of conflicts. 
 
A succession of events during the federation years, culminating in the forced incorporation of 
Eritrea into the Ethiopian empire, led a number of Eritreans to seek independence by the use of 
arms. Hamid Idris Awate launched the Eritrean armed struggle on September 1, 1961 after 
attacking an isolated Ethiopian garrison in the western part of the country (Iyob, 1995:92). 
Markakis (1987:67) explains that, although both the ELM and the ELF have claimed Awate as 
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their own none of the two movements had anything to do with his initial armed engagements 
with the Ethiopian forces. 
 
After Awate‟s shootings, the ELM, the ELF, and the EPLF carried out the armed struggle over 
Eritrea‟s independence. The Eritrean armed struggle evolved from occasional ambushes and hit-
and-run guerrilla operations to large-scale conventional military confrontations between the 
Eritrean liberation movements and the Ethiopian army.  
 
During the first decade of the conflict, the ELF resorted to rurally based guerrilla tactics due to 
its strategic disadvantages in open confrontations with the Ethiopian security forces. The group‟s 
attacks focused on police stations to capture Ethiopian military hardware (Shairman 1980:73), 
the assassination of individuals considered to oppose the revolutionary cause and acts of 
sabotage against vital infrastructures such as oil storage tanks, roads, railways (Pateman, 
1990:85), and Ethiopian Airlines‟ planes (Sherman, 198:78). During this period, material aid for 
the Eritrean insurgents came from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Libya (Heraclides 
1991:188). 
 
The Ethiopian authorities attempted to counter the ELF by exploiting regional and religious 
rivalries between the populace (divide and rule policy) and attacking the ELF zones (military 
policy) (Pateman, 1990:85). The government of Haile Selassie depended significantly upon the 
United States and Israel for material military support. For instance, Sherman (1980:75) reports, 
“from 1953 to 1970 the United States provided $147 million in military assistance to Haile 
Selassie‟s government. This amounted to almost one-half of the total US military assistance to 
all African countries during that time span”. 
 
The second decade of the Eritrean conflict started with strong Ethiopian military and diplomatic 
offensive against the Eritrean secessionists precipitated by the ambush and killing of a high-
ranking Ethiopian military commander (Sherman 1980:79).  In late 1970 a state of emergence 
was declared in much of Eritrea followed by an attack against the ELF-held areas including a 
bombing campaign by the Ethiopian Air Force and the implementation of forced resettlement 
schemes to cut off popular support to the guerrillas (Thomas, 2012:8). Furthermore, the emperor 
proceeded to fight the Eritreans in the diplomatic arena preventing them from getting further 
military aid from the Sudan, China and South Yemen (Sherman, 1980:80). This offensive had 
the immediate effect of not only reducing Eritrean guerrilla operations but also alienating the 
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rural populace causing resurgence in membership for the liberation movements (Thomas, 
2012:8). 
 
The period between 1970 and 1974 saw the fragmentation of the Eritrean liberation movements 
and the beginning of the civil war fought between the ELF and the recently formed EPLF. The 
war ended in 1974 after the Dergue, the military junta that overthrew Selassie‟s imperial regime, 
made it an imperative for the two liberation movements to mount a united front against the new 
regime in Addis Ababa. According to Heraclides (1991:182), the Dergue persisted with 
Selassie‟s policy on the Eritrean issue. In 1976, Eritrean forces launched a massive offensive 
against the Dergue‟s troops “amassing victory after victory, in the military arena and liberating 
most of Eritrea‟s towns” (Sherman, 1980:87), and by early 1978, the ELF and the EPLF 
controlled the whole of Eritrea (Markakis, 1987:63). 
 
Eritrean military gains during this period coincided with superpower realignment in the Horn of 
Africa and the Somali invasion of the Ogaden region. In 1977, the US began to cut off military 
aid to Addis Ababa while Moscow stepped in to fill the void (Pateman, 1990:88). Moreover, it 
has been argued that during that period, the Ethiopian government, under Soviet and Cuban 
patronage, directed its energies against a more serious international challenger, Somalia, turning 
its attention toward Eritrea once the Somali army had been driven out of Ethiopia (Pateman, 
1990:88). This interpretation is supported by the fact that the Ethiopian army managed to retake 
most of the towns held by the Eritrean secessionists six months after the Ogaden war. According 
to Sherman (1980:93) “the 1978 Ethiopian assault was, for most part, engineered by the Soviets 
and carried out by Ethiopian, Cuban and South Yemeni forces”. 
 
After the 1978 Ethiopian offensive, the Eritrean armed struggle reached a strategic stalemate, 
which lasted until 1984. This period saw the beginning of a new round of armed confrontations 
in the Eritrean civil war (1980-1981) ending with the defeat of the ELF and ushering in EPLF 
hegemony (Markakis, 1987:67). The EPLF continued to gain support from the Eritrean masses 
and managed to mobilize the Eritreans against the Dergue (Mussie, 2011:). Furthermore, a 
weakened and demoralized Ethiopian army launched several failed attacks against the EPLF, 
which resulted in the build up of the Eritreans‟ military arsenal as they captured large amounts of 




The military stalemate was broken in 1984 with the EPLF moving into the offensive (Markakis, 
1987:68). In March 1988 the balance of power shifted in favor of the Eritreans after their 
decisive victory at the battle of Afabet (Pateman, 1990:80). In this regard, Mussie (2011:68) 
comments that “the defeat of the Ethiopian army at the battle of Afabet was an immesurable 
military loss for Ethiopia, but it remarkably boosted the fighting morale of the liberation army”. 
Fierce battles continued with the EPLF collaborating with the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) and the Afar Liberation front (Pateman, 1990:94). 
 
In 1990 the EPLF captured the port city of Massawa
5
, followed by the liberation of all major 
towns of Eritrea (Mussie 2011). On May 24, 1991 the EPLF liberated Asmara while the EPRDF 
took over Addis Ababa four days later (Iyob, 1995:136). These events lead to a regime change in 
Ethiopia and a de facto independence to Eritrea (Thomas, 2012:12). Two years later a UN 
sponsored referendum was organized and 99.8 percent of Eritreans voted for independence 
(Iyob, 1995:136). Eritrea was officially admitted into the community of states on May 24, 1993.  
 
3.6 Explaining the determinants of Eritrea’s Successful Secession 
 
The central question arising from the preceding discussion is why was Eritrea‟s struggle for 
statehood successful? Eritrean secessionist movements conducted their struggle for 
independence amidst a number of factors that had prevented previous secessionist attempts in 
Katanga, Biafra, Casamance, from succeeding. These factors included scarce international 
recognition of the struggle, restricted supply of military arsenal, and an international consensus 
on the fear of the “Balkanization” of the African continent. In this context, it becomes legitimate 
to ask what factors contributed for the success of the Eritrean cause? This section argues that 
Eritrea‟s successful secession is the result of a tight combination of domestic and international 
factors including Eritrea‟s historical and legal claims, the Dergue‟s policies of alienation, the 
effectiveness of the EPLF‟s strategies, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, and the role of the United States of America. 
 
3.6.1 Eritrea’s Historical and Legal Claims 
 
The first factor that influenced Eritrea‟s successful political separation from Ethiopia relates to 
historical and legal considerations governing the relations between the two political entities. It 
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has been argued that from historical and legal perspective Eritrea had strong foundations for its 
claim to independent statehood. However, Cold War politics and superpower rivalries favored 
Ethiopian interests over those of Eritrea (Iyob, 1995:138). This is in agreement with Coggins‟ 
theory of state birth highlighting the pursuit of external security as one of the driving forces for 
state‟s recognition (Coggins 2011:449). 
 
Haille Selassie‟s imperial government and the military regime that replaced it argued insistently 
that Eritrea was not historically a distinct entity, but part of a “Greater Ethiopia”. The Ethiopian 
claimed that both entities had been part of the ancient Axumite kingdom that existed between 
100 and 940 AD. Hence, Eritrea‟s incorporation into the Ethiopian empire represented the 
reintegration of two entities that had been artificially separated by the forces of colonialism and 
great power politics (Sherman, 1980:29). 
 
In contrast, Eritreans maintained that Ethiopia had no historical claim over Eritrea. The 
Ethiopian empire had lost that right when Emperor Menelik signed a series of treaties with Italy 
between 1886 and 1889 allowing the Italians to colonize Eritrea. Menelik‟s actions granted a de 
facto recognition of Eritrea as a political entity separate from Ethiopia. Thus, Italian colonial rule 
“brought forth Eritrea as a multi-national state with a definite political and geographical identity” 
(Sherman, 1980:32). 
 
Eritreans have also argued that their cause was not one of secession, but one of self-
determination. Eritrea was entitled to political separation from Ethiopia because the country‟s 
status as a former colony was consistent with the principles of the OAU (sanctity of inherited 
colonial borders) and the UN regarding the emergence of African states in the post-colonial era 
(Heraclides, 1991:186). In addition, the UN resolution to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia - 
regarding Eritrea as a distinct entity, with a separate constitution, a different system of 
government and separate executive and legislative body – made it clear that Eritrea was not 
liable to annexation by Ethiopia. Hence, Emperor Selassie‟s abrogation of the Ethio-Eritrean 
federal arrangement was not only an open defiance to the UN resolution but also a clear 






3.6.2 The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of Cold War  
 
Without the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent termination of the Cold War, 
Eritrea‟s attainment of statehood would have been difficult. The fragmentation of the Soviet 
Union cut off guaranteed military assistance to the Ethiopian regime from the Soviet bloc, it 
changed the East-West framework from which the superpowers viewed developments in the 
Horn of Africa, and opened a new window of opportunity for the emergence of new nation-
states.   
 
From 1977 to 1991 the Ethiopian government depended considerably on military support from 
the Soviet Union and its allies. The USSR became Ethiopia‟s major arms supplier after 
Washington cut off military assistance to Addis Ababa due to human rights violations
6
. It has 
been reported that by July 1977 the Soviet Union had agreed to supply $500 million worth of 
arms including jet-fighters and missiles to the Ethiopians (Sherman, 1980:90). Soviet arsenal, 
Cuban military personnel and other Soviet allies sustained Ethiopia‟s war efforts during the last 
quarter of the Cold War. As previously mentioned, Soviet military assistance was instrumental in 
ensuring Ethiopia‟s victory over the Somali army during the invasion of the Ogaden region, the 
re-conquest of Eritrea from the Eritrean liberation movements in the offensives of 1978, and in 
subsequent assaults aimed at crushing guerrilla insurgencies in Eritrea and Ethiopia.  
 
However, the Ethiopian regime guaranteed support network began to collapse in 1987 after the 
new leadership in Moscow warned Addis Ababa that they could not count on continuing supply 
of arms. Soviet authorities informed Mengistu that the Soviet-Ethiopian arms deal would not be 
renewed after 1990. In that same year Cuban and East German troops began to withdraw from 
Ethiopia (Schraeder, 1992:165). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by the 
capture of Asmara and Addis Ababa by the EPLF and the TPLF respectively, thus signaling the 
end of Mengistu‟s rule over Ethiopia. 
 
In terms of global politics, the end of the Cold War led to unprecedented changes in superpower 
rivalries (Iyob, 1995:124). During the Cold War events in the Horn of Africa and other regions 
of the world were analyzed within the East-West framework, as means of preventing or 
advancing superpowers sphere of influence. However, the end of the Cold War called into 
question a series of Cold War rationales and the policies they generated (Schraeder, 1992:571). 
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As a result, political developments in Eritrea began to be viewed in their own right not as an 
extension of East-West ideological confrontation. 
 
Furthermore, the process of reforming the Soviet Union initiated by Michael Gorbatchov in 1986 
infused “new life into the concept of the right to self-determination” (Negash, 1997:163). As 
pointed out by Schraeder (1992:172), Gorbachev's policy approach towards Eastern Europe 
“entailed Soviet tolerance for the fall of single-party communist states and a recognition of the 
need to allow the peoples of Eastern Europe to determine their own political paths independent 
of Soviet control”. This process called for the reassessment of the international framework 
governing the emergence of new sovereign states. 
 
It was in this climate of relaxed approach to the principle of state sovereignty that Eritreans were 
allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. In the words of Iyob (1995:138) “the 
demand of the Eritrean people for self-determination was no longer seen as an isolated case 
viewed as a dangerous precedent, but one of many cases”.  
 
3.6.3 The Role of the United States of America  
 
The United States‟ efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the civil war in Ethiopia in the late 
1980s contributed resolutely for Eritrea‟s successful secession. Paquin (2010:128) points out that 
the fate of Eritrea had always been linked to US geostrategic interests. From 1952 to 1991 
successive administrations in Washington DC consistently opposed Eritrea‟s independence on 
the basis of maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa. In 1991 the Bush administration reversed 
this policy after Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman Cohen declared US support for a 
UN-supervised referendum on Eritrean independence (Schraeder, 1992:570).  
 
Starting in 1989 various third parties including Italy and the US attempted to broker peace deals 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Ethiopia and various opposition movements operating 
inside the country (Keller, 2007:24). The US engaged on a number of official and un-official 
talks with Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders, including the failed mediation efforts conducted by 
former President Jimmy Carter in 1989 (Paquin, 2010:139). The US intensified its level of 
involvement after Mengistu‟s departure from power on May 21, 1991. The Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs Herman Cohen was sent to London to mediate between the insurgents 




According to Schraeder (1992:570) “the net result of US involvement was a significant 
contribution to a transfer of power, which largely avoided the bloodshed and clan conflict still 
evident in Somalia”. As part of the Agreements, the US authorized the TPLF to takeover Addis 
Ababa and establish a broad coalition government there. Moreover, the US also declared its 
support for a referendum on Eritrea‟s independence after a two-year transitional period. 
 
Paquin (2010:140) has argued that American support for a referendum on Eritrea‟s independence 
was a political tool to stop the civil war and establish stability in both Ethiopia and Eritrea. In his 
own words, “a denial of Eritrea‟s right to secede may have caused war to resume in Ethiopia”. In 
addition, American officials also requested the EPLF leadership not to issue a unilateral 
declaration of independence after they captured Asmara in 1991 because it would further 
destabilize Ethiopia. The US argued that both the new Ethiopian and Eritrean government 
needed to consolidate their power to facilitate a stable transition to Eritrea‟s independence.  
 
Finally, the US affirmed Eritrea‟s right to self-determination without the previous consent of the 
OAU leaving “the organization with very little option but to back this policy” (Paquin, 
2010:141).  
 
This resonates with Coggins (2011:449) observations that when a Great Power - in this case the 
United States - confers legitimacy upon a secessionist movement/state its decision initiates a 
cascade of legitimacy throughout the remaining members of the system. 
 
3.6.4 The Dergue’s Policies of Alienation 
 
Internally, the policies of the Dergue, the military regime that replaced Selassie‟s monarchical 
and feudal government eased Eritrea‟s path to independence. The Dergue ruled Ethiopia between 
1974 and 1991. During this period, the military regime implemented a series of policies that 
isolated it from groups inside and outside Ethiopia. The activities of these opposition movements 
precipitated the erosion of the Dergue paving the way for favorable negotiated settlements on 
Eritrea‟s independence. 
 
Upon acceding to power, the Dergue adopted “Ethiopia First” as the motto of the Ethiopian 
government. Berhe (2004:574) notes how “this ideology was oriented towards both nationalism 
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and modernization, and was thus „directed against the weakening of the state by secessionist 
movements‟”. Since the Dergue regarded “Ethiopia as a monolithic society”, it proceeded to 
declare any “ethno-nationalist grievance or demand for self-determination as contrary to 
Ethiopian unity and interests” (Berhe, 2004:574). 
 
As a result, nationalist groups demanding any form of self-determination were targeted. 
Thousands of Ethiopians and Eritreans were imprisoned, tortured or executed in what became 
known as “Red Terror” (Thomas, 2012:9). The Dergue‟s excesses led to the emergence of many 
socio-political groups challenging the military government in Ethiopia including the Western 
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF). The ELPF began a campaign of coalition building with these groups and 
their coordinated activities proved decisive in the victory against the Dergue. 
 
In addition, the Dergue‟s espousal of Marxism and military cooperation with the Soviet Union 
made it unpopular amongst Western countries including the United States. In 1976 President 
Carter‟s administration cut off military assistance to Addis Ababa evoking amongst other 
reasons, “gross violations of human rights, including summary executions” and the conclusion of 
a $100 million arms deal with the Soviet Union (Sherman, 1980:89). In 1984, the great famine 
intensified international scrutiny to the Ethiopian government‟s internal policies as the 
catastrophe coincided with the foundation of a communist party along Soviet lines followed by 
extravagant celebrations. According to Negash (1997:165), “the communist ideology pursued by 
the government and the war in Eritrea, which by this time had extended into the Northern region 
of the country, were henceforth regarded as the reasons for the famine”.  
 
The Ethiopian government was further criticized by the international community due to the 
authoritarian manner in which it attempted to resettle thousands of famine stricken families to 
the more fertile regions of the country. Negash (1997:165) notes that “more than half a million 
people had been forcibly moved, leaving behind them thousands of people dead either on the 
long journeys to the homes they did not choose or in ill-prepared habitat”. 
 
The policies of the Dergue not only created international hostility towards the government in 
Addis Ababa but also drove thousands of recruits into the camps of the guerrilla movements. For 
instance, in 1989 the TPLF had grown to such an extent that the Ethiopian government 
considered it be a more dangerous threat than the EPLF. By 1991, the TPLF won state power in 
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Ethiopia in the name of the Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
(Berhe 2004:569). 
 
3.6.5 The Strategies of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front  
 
The success of Eritrea‟s struggle for statehood was also facilitated by the military defeat of the 
Ethiopian regime. The defeat of the Dergue can be attributed to a number of factors including the 
military and diplomatic tactics of the Eritrean liberation movements. Special attention must be 
paid to the strategies of the EPLF, as it was the sole movement to engage the Ethiopian 
government in the last and decisive decade of the armed struggle. The fight against Ethiopian 
occupation was fought on two fronts: through military campaigns against the Ethiopian army and 
through diplomatic endeavors aiming at explaining the reasons for Eritrea‟s independence. 
 
On the military front, the EPLF adopted a number of strategies that proved effective. Firstly, the 
EPLF counteracted the military superiority of the Ethiopian army by adhering to the practices of 
guerrilla tactics and protracted warfare (Thomas, 2012:1). Secondly, the EPLF secured massive 
popular support to the struggle by adopting a number of social reforms in the territories under its 
control such as ownership, health, education and gender relations (Sherman, 1980:101-106). 
Thirdly, the EPLF relied primarily on Ethiopia as source of arms and equipment capturing it on 
the battlefield and in guerrilla raids on specific targets (Keller, 2007:24). Fourthly, the EPLF put 
in practice a policy of self-reliance in the liberated zones setting up industries to manufacture and 
repair medicines, clothes, vehicles, arms and military equipment. Lastly, the EPLF established 
alliances with other groups within Ethiopia opposing the Dergue‟s regime such as the TPLF and 
the OLF.  
 
It is worth noting that, in the late 1980‟s, the various dissident groups fighting the Ethiopian 
government united under one organization umbrella called the Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF).  As stated by Iyob (1995:134) the EPLF‟s alliance with the EPRDF 
“was based on the latter‟s recognition of the Eritrean demand for self-determination and a mutual 
conviction of the need to rid Ethiopia of the Mengistu regime”. Both the EPLF and the EPRDF 
coordinated their offensives against the Ethiopian forces. The EPLF focused on the capture of 
Asmara while the EPRDF relied on EPLF logistical support for the capture of Addis Ababa. 
Eventually the two fronts defeated the Ethiopian army becoming the main participants in the US-
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led ceasefire negotiations in London. In 1993 Eritrea became independent with the full blessing 
of the EPRDF government in Addis Ababa. 
 
The fight was equally effective on the diplomatic front. The EPLF embarked on a policy of 
winning over international public opinion to the cause of the Eritrean people. To this end three 
main strategies were implemented: firstly, the EPLF reframed the nature of its armed struggle 
from anti-colonial war to a war for the exercise of the right to self-determination (Negash, 
1997:163); secondly, the EPLF issued a document referendum stating that Eritreans should be 
given the option to choose from one of the three alternatives: a) union; b) federation within a 
regional autonomy framework; or, c) independence; thirdly, the EPLF sought African support for 
Eritrean self-determination pointing to parallelisms between Eritrea and the historical and legal 




The strategy emphasizing the right to self-determination as the primary cause of the war 
garnered enormous support in Europe and North America. Although, in its proposal the EPLF 
attributed supervisory role to the OAU and the UN implementation of the referendum option the 
Ethiopian government dismissed it. The EPLF‟s proposal was seen as evidence that the 
movement was trying to find a political solution to the conflict (Negash, 1997:164).   
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the dynamics of Eritrean secession as well as the determining factors 
for Eritrea‟s successful accession to statehood. In the course of almost a century Eritrea was 
established as an Italian colony (1890-1941), administered by Great Britain (1941-1952), 
federated and incorporated into Ethiopia and finally becoming an independent state.  
 
Eritrean sense of a distinct national identity emerged during the decades of Italian colonial rule, 
intensified during the years of British administration maturing as a result of the experiences of 
oppressive Ethiopian imperialism. A series of socio-political and economic grievances against 
Addis Ababa‟s systematic dismantlement of Eritrea‟s federal status led to the rise of secessionist 
movements in Eritrea and the beginning of nearly three decades of armed conflict, which ended 
with the defeat of the Ethiopian army. This last event paved the way for a UN-monitored 
referendum on Eritrean independence and the territory‟s accession to statehood.  
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Since the armed struggle for Eritrea‟s independence was conducted amidst a number of factors 
that had prevented previous secessionist attempts from succeeding, this chapter has argued that 
Eritrea‟s successful secession was the result of a tight combination of both domestic and external 
factors. Domestically, the Ethiopian army was defeated as a result of the Dergue‟s policies of 
alienation and the effectiveness of the strategies of the EPLF. Externally, Eritrea‟s historical and 
legal claims to sovereignty, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as well 
as the mediating role of the United States were decisive in ensuring Eritrea‟s recognition as an 
independent state on May 24, 1993.  
 
The next chapter will investigate the process of South Sudan‟s struggle for independence as well 








The Republic of South Sudan is Africa‟s newest state. Southern Sudan became independent after 
formally separating from the Republic of Sudan on July 9, 2011. Like Eritrea eighteen years 
earlier, Southern Sudan achieved statehood through the process of secession. This was an 
unexpected political event in post-colonial Africa considering that the AU has not altered its 
views on secession since Eritrea‟s independence. Secession still remains the antithesis of African 
statehood. The cases of Somaliland as well as the islands of Anjouan and Mohedi support this 
view: the former remains on a legal limbo while the later was annulled after harsh AU‟s 
sanctions on its leaders. 
 
Thus, in line with the structure and approach of the preceding chapter on the secession of Eritrea, 
this chapter investigates the reasons why Southern Sudan successfully separated from the Sudan. 
The chapter achieves this objective by analyzing the dynamics of the partition of the Sudan 
through the lenses of the theoretical assumptions upon which the research has been constructed. 
The chapter further examines the political geography and history of South Sudan, the genesis of 
secessionist alienation, the emergence of secessionist movements, the North-South conflict as 
well as the determinants of South Sudan‟s successful withdrawal from the Sudan.  
 
4.2. Political Geography and History of South Sudan 
 
As previously mentioned, secessions do not occur in the vacuum; several factors must be in 
place before secessionist impulses can develop. Wood‟s analytical framework indicates that 
geography, history and demographics play a decisive role in secessionist endeavors (Wood, 
1980:112). Indeed, the desire to separate a sub-state unit in order to create an independent and 
sovereign political entity presupposes the existence of a people inhabiting a given territory. In 





The Republic of South Sudan, formerly known as the Southern region of the Sudan, is a 
landlocked country situated in East-Central Africa
8
. The country occupies an area of about 640 
thousand square kilometers (Salman, 2013:345) sharing borders with six sovereign states: 
Ethiopia to the east, Kenya and Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to 
the southwest, the Central African Republic to the west, and the Sudan to the North.  
 
South Sudan has a population estimated at around 11.5 million inhabitants, distributed among 
three main ethno-linguistic groups: Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Sudanic groups (World Fact 
Book, 2014). Nilotic groups (comprising the Dinka, the Nuer, and the Shilluk constitute the 
majority), with the Dinka being the biggest and leading group economically and politically 
(Heraclides, 1987:216). The pattern of life of the people of South Sudan is framed by the 
environment in which they inhabit, with most groups living as sedentary farmers, agro-
pastoralists and seasonal fishermen. In terms of religious belief, many Southern Sudanese adhere 
to indigenous religion, Christianity and Islam (Salman, 2013:346).  
 
Historically, the different communities inhabiting the territories of modern South Sudan 
followed different forms of political organisations. Some groups such as the Shilluk and the 
Azande were organized into kingdoms and chiefdoms; while pastoralist groups such as the 
Dinka, Nuer, Murle and the Toposa acknowledged diffused and sparse forms of political 
authority (Johnson, 2004:12). These diverse communities and nationalities emerged as a unified 
political entity during the period of British and Egyptian colonial administration of the Sudan 
between 1899 and1956. 
 
The documented history of South Sudan is intrinsically linked to the emergence of modern 
Sudan nearly two centuries ago. This history, which began with the southward expansion of the 
Turco-Egyptian regime of Mohamed Ali Pasha in 1821, has been characterized by Southern 
resistance against successive waves of foreign “invading” powers (Wassara, 2015:54). The 
Turco-Egyptian regime in the Sudan (1820-1881), also known as Turkiyya, extended its rule to 
the territories of South Sudan. These “uninvited guests” from the North (mostly soldiers, 
merchants, explorers and adventurers) moved into the South in search of ivory, slaves and the 
source of the Nile Basin (Salman, 2013: 347).  
 
                                                 
8
 See map at appendices 1 and 3. 
46 
 
The Mahdist regime (1881-1898), which overthrew the Turco-Egyptian regime, had no control 
over the South except for a few military outposts (Rogier, 2005:7). The Mahdist state built on the 
Turco-egyptian regime‟s exploitative practices against the South. Practices such as slave-raiding 
and slave-trading escalated (Salman, 2013: 347) as well as the forcible conscription of the people 
of Southern Sudan into the fighting forces of the Mahdist state (Wassara, 2015:54). 
 
British and Egyptian forces defeated the Mahdist state asserting their authority over the South in 
1899. This affair ended expansionist and imperial competition over the region between Britain, 
Egypt, Belgium, France and Ethiopia. The Sudan became an Anglo-Egyptian colony, 
“recognized as an Egyptian possession administered by British officials on behalf of the King of 
Egypt” (Johnson, 2004:21). The British began to implement the Southern Policy, a policy of 
separate administration and separate development for the northern and southern regions of the 
colony (Johnson, 2004:25; Ali et al, 2005:167; Rogier, 2005:7; Salman, 2013:347).  
 
The Southern Policy encompassed the establishment of different policies regarding 
administration, law, religion and education between the two parts of the country; closure of 
borders and restriction of movements between South and the North through the Passports and 
Permits Ordinance (Salman, 2013:349). In the words of the British Civil Secretary (cited in 
Johnson, 2004:11), “the administration of South Sudan was to be developed along „African‟, 
rather than „Arab‟ lines, and that the future of Southern Sudan might ultimately lie with the 
countries of British East Africa, rather than with the Middle East”.  
 
The establishment of Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule in the Sudan exacerbated a regional gap 
between the North and the South (Dersso, 2012:7). Johnson (2004:10) observes that “the South 
remained in the periphery of central government thinking throughout the Condominium period”, 
that is the period of Anglo=Egyptian administration of the Sudan. This was particularly evident 
in terms of access to education, socio-economic development and participation in administration 
of the Sudan. Political and educational institutions in the North benefited greatly from 
government support. Moreover, large-scale economic investment, infrastructure and industrial 
projects were concentrated in the Northern provinces (Dersso, 2012:7). Contrastingly, there was 
little educational investment in the South and no major economic schemes were attempted in the 
region. Hence, the South was socially, economically and politically disadvantaged in relation to 




The Southern policy was reversed in 1947 after the British Foreign Office decided to unite the 
North and the South in the run up to Sudan‟s independence. It has since been speculated in the 
literature that the reversal of the Southern Policy was motivated by Egyptian and Northern 
Sudanese nationalist insistence for a united Sudan (Johnson, 2004:25; Rogier, 2005:9). What is 
certain is that the Sudan gained independence as unified and country on January 1, 1956. 
 
4.3 The Genesis of Secessionist Alienation in South Sudan 
 
In addition to territorial and demographic considerations, Wood‟s analytical framework argues 
that separatist estrangement between the potentially secessionist population and its respective 
central government is often motivated by the prevalence of social, economic, political and 
psychological grievances (Wood, 1980:22). In the case of the Sudan, southern grievances against 
the north were rooted in the country‟s pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history (Dersso, 
2012:5). However, this study focuses on the most recent origins of the North-South divide, 
which lies on the politics leading to Sudan‟s independence.  
 
Britain abolished the policy of separate administration and development for Northern and 
Southern Sudan at the Juba Conference in 1947 (Johnson, 2004:25). Northerners and 
Southerners were brought together in preparations for the independence of a united Sudan. 
However, the legacy of the Southern policy in terms of extreme inequalities between the two 
regions and groups made it clear that one would dominate the other. In the words of Oromo 
(2015:70) “Southerners lacked the experience and education that would enable them to function 
as legislators and thus would be easily manipulated by Northerners”. 
 
In early 1952, Northern representatives, which constituted the majority in the Legislative 
Assembly, rejected provisions in the draft constitution of the Sudan concerning demands for 
certain safeguards for the South. These included a bi-federal secular state and the appointment of 
a minister for southern affairs responsible for the social and economic empowerment of 
Southerners (Oromo, 2015:70). Late that same year, Southerners were excluded from crucial 
constitutional discussions concerning the future of the country on the grounds that they were not 
organized in political parties. The talks took place in Cairo and involved Northern political 
parties and the Condominium powers
9
 (Wassara, 2015:64).  
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The “Sudanization” process (the replacement of foreign civil service workers for Sudanese 
servants) confirmed Southern fears of Northern domination, as only six out of 800 senior posts in 
the administration were accorded to Southerners (Heraclides, 1987:217). Moreover, Southerners 
complained about being underrepresented in the country‟s first elected government:  the cabinet 
included only three Southerners in the junior posts of state rather than full, ministers; and just 
three out of 46 members in the Constitutional Assembly were Southerners (Salman, 2013:351).  
 
Issues concerning the nature of the post-independent state played a role in fuelling the tensions 
between the two ethno-regional groups. The Sudan was granted independence with a temporary 
constitution. The mission of defining the character of the post-colonial state was left to the first 
elected government. Decisions were to be made between a federal or unitary state, and between a 
secular and an Islamic constitution. Southerners favored federalism as a mean of escaping 
Northern domination while Northerners argued that federalism was the first step towards 
separatism. In the end, the Sudan failed to achieve a federal and secular constitution as Northern 
ideas of a unitary Islamic state prevailed (Johnson, 2004:30). 
 
Besides, the political elite in the North held the view that the South was culturally void and 
should be filled with Arab-Islamic culture (Heraclides, 1987:218). In line with this view the 
military government of general Abbud pursued an aggressive policy of Islamization and 
Arabization in the South, focusing on education. Johnson (2004:30) observes that: mission 
schools were placed under government control; Arabic became the official medium of 
instruction; conversions to Islam were encouraged; and the activities of missionaries were 
intensely restricted until they were finally expelled in 1964. 
 
This sequence of events and measures galvanized the Southern Sudanese political elite to engage 
on organized political and military opposition against the government in Khartoum. The 
Southern separatist movement gained momentum with the influx of senior politicians and 
students that went to exile to form political organizations and guerrilla forces (Johnson, 
2004:31). 
 
4.4 The Rise of Secessionist Movements in South Sudan 
 
Secessionist efforts are consolidated in the formation of organizations charged with the task of 
articulating the group‟s grievances, creating the picture of the nation to be created and the 
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initiation of an “outbidding contest with the central government and with loyalist representatives 
of their region” (Wood, 1980:123).  
 
In the Sudan, Southern politicians began to organize in political parties in the run up to the 
independence of the Sudan. Indeed, fears of Northern domination in a post-independent Sudan 
motivated Southern representatives at the 1947 Juba Conference to demand political safeguards 
for the South including federation and independence (Salman, 203:349). The Liberal Party, the 
first Southern political party, participated in the electoral process that inaugurated the country‟s 
first Legislative Assembly in 1953. The party campaigned under a platform that called for a 
degree of autonomy and self-government for the South (Wassara, 2015:65).  
 
Nevertheless, the rise of Southern secessionist organizations began in earnest in 1962 with the 
foundation of the Sudan African National Union (SANU). In subsequent years, several other 
separatist organisations emerged. This section examines briefly the context and politics of 
SANU, the Anyanya Guerrilla Movement, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), 
and the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The selection of these 
movements is based on their impacts on Southern Sudan‟s struggle for independence. 
 
4.4.1 The Sudan African National Union (SANU) 
 
SANU, Southern Sudan‟s first separatist movement, was established in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) 
in February 1962. The movement was founded by exiled Southern politicians such as Fr. 
Saturnino Lohure, Aggrey Jaden, Joseph Oduho and William Deng (Daly & Holt, 1988:179) and 
subscribed to the ideology of Black Nationalism (Heraclides, 1987:220). SANU‟s ultimate 
public political objective was “self-determination”, understood as a complete independence for 
the South. The movement called publicly for the exercise of the broad right of self-determination 
rather than the more specific demand for secession because it contradicted the newly founded 
OAU‟s pledge to protect the sanctity of the inherited colonial borders (Johnson, 2011:210). 
  
SANU began to fragment in 1964 after the fall of the military regime of general Abbud. The new 
civilian government invited the exiled leadership to return to the country and participate in the 
resolution of the Southern problem at the Round Table Conference (Daly & Holt, 1988:185). 
William Deng abandoned the call for independence in favor of federalism. He remained in the 
Sudan leading SANU “Inside”. Jaden and Oduho maintained the demand for self-determination. 
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They returned to Uganda as leaders of SANU “Outside”. Fr. Saturnino Lohure concentrated his 
efforts on military matters (Johnson, 2004:32). 
 
Subsequently, SANU “Outside” began to disintegrate into several minor organizations. In 1967 
the Azania Liberation Front (ALF), a faction that espoused Southern independence, broke away 
from SANU. The South Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) replaced the ALF in 1967. The 
SSPG had a secessionist agenda. It changed its name to Nile Provisional Government two NPG 
in 1969 (Daly & Holt, 1988:200). The wave of factionalism and in-group fighting was brought to 
an end in 1969, when Colonel Joseph Lagu backed by Anyanya provincial commanders united 
all the disparate political and military groups under the authority of the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Front (SSLF) (Johnson, 2004:33). 
 
4.4.2 The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) 
 
Joseph Lagu established the SSLM in 1971. The movement emerged from the restructuring of 
the Southern Sudan Liberation Front (SSLF). Lagu, a seasoned military commander, and other 
provincial military leaders not only united all Southern guerrilla forces under a single military 
command but also subordinated the political wing to the military (Johnson, 2004:37). According 
to Heraclides (1987:220), “the SSLM‟s ultimate aim appeared to vary from time to time”. The 
movement started out as an advocate of Southern self-determination but ended up settling for 
regional autonomy. 
 
The SSLM was the chief Southern negotiator partner during the Peace Agreement with the 
Nimeiri‟s regime in 1972. The movement achieved supremacy in the South‟s politico-military 
arena as a result of massive internal and external support. In 1969, Lagu enjoyed strong support 
from the people of Southern Sudan, Anyanya commanders and Southern exiled politicians 
leading him to found the SSLF. The Sudan government‟s alignment with the Arab world in the 
context of the Arab-Israeli war attracted the attention of external players to the Sudan. The 
Ethiopian government began to support the Southern Sudanese cause in response to Sudan‟s 
support to the Eritreans (Johnson, 2004:37). Israel began a network of military support to the 






4.4.3 The Anyanya Guerrilla Movement 
 
The Anyanya derived its name from the Madi word for the venom of a snake, the Gabon‟s viper. 
The movement began in 1963 and consisted of a loosely-knit guerrilla army operating 
independently of each other (Johnson, 2011:210). The Anyanya lacked a unified ethnic core and 
centralized political wing. This often resulted in factional fighting based on ethnicity, personal 
ambitions, tactics, and the aims of the struggle (Heraclides, 1987:219). The nucleus of the 
Anyanya guerrilla force consisted of veterans of the 1955 mutiny who had retreated to the bush 
in neighboring countries (Daly & Holt, 1988:200). Disgruntled civil servants, students and 
soldiers serving in Southern Sudan joined the old veterans (Johnson, 2011:216).  The movement 
espoused a secessionist agenda and this limited its ability to secure steady external support, 
especially from neighboring African countries. (Ali et al, 2005:199).  
 
In its early years, the Anyanya movement relied on the Sudanese security forces for military 
hardware. The guerrillas armed themselves mainly by “theft from police outposts, the occasional 
ambush of army patrols or through the defection of Southern police or soldiers” (Johnson, 
2004:31). The military capability of the guerrillas began to increase in 1964 after the capture of 
significant shipments of arms from the civilian government in Khartoum to the Simba rebels in 
the Congo. The Anyanya relieved the Simbas of remaining weapons after their defeat by the 
Congolese government (Johnson, 2004:32).  
 
As a result, from the mid-1960s the Anyanya movement evolved into a sufficiently large force to 
mount a high-intensity warfare against Khartoum. The unification of the Anyanya under one 
military commander, Joseph Lagu and the introduction of steady military aid from Ethiopia, 
Israel and Uganda enhanced the movement‟s military capabilities. These developments 
contributed to the conditions leading to the peace agreements of 1972 (Ali et al., 2005:199). The 
agreements had a provision for the absorption of the guerrillas into the national army and other 
security branches (Johnson, 2004:41).   
 
4.4.4 The Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) 
 
The SPLA/M was formed in Ethiopia in mid-July 1983. The movement developed out of the 
merger of the Anyanya II and dissident soldiers of the Sudanese Army stationed in the South. 
The Anyanya II was a loose military organization made up of old Anyanya guerrilla fighters and 
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some exiled Southern politicians who were disappointed with the terms of the Addis Ababa 
Peace Agreement. These forces were combined with groups of disenchanted soldiers who 
mutinied against the national army and deserted from their battalions, garrisons and military 
units across the South as a result of dissatisfactions with the peace process (Johnson, 2011:214). 
 
From the start, the SPLM declared that its goal was not the separation of the South, but “the 
national „liberation‟ of Sudan and the establishment of a secular, socialist, and a united Sudan” 
(Ali et al., 2005:200). This overarching goal represented not only a discontinuity with the 
secessionist agenda of previous Southern organizations, but also required the overthrowing of the 
government in Khartoum and the creation of a “New Sudan”. The “New Sudan” would “reflect 
the diversity of the population and ensure all groups equal access to economic and political 
power” (Rogier, 2005:18). The movement embraced socialism as the ideological framework that 
would shape the transformation of the “Old Sudan” into the “New Sudan” (Rogier, 2005:18). 
 
The history of the SPLM has been characterized by splits, mutinies, and instability. The first split 
occurred immediately after the formation of the movement and was driven by disputes over 
leadership and the aims of the struggle. Senior Anyanya veterans (Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot 
Atem) challenged John Garang‟s leadership based on their seniority over him in the old 
Anyanya. The old Anyanya veterans also supported independence for the South. Younger cadres 
such as John Garang, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol and Salva Kiir Mayardit dismissed Samuel and 
Akuot‟s groups from the movement (Johnson, 2004:65). The two groups confronted each other 
on the battlefield initiating an ethnic conflict in the South between the Nuer and the Dinka 
(Rogier, 2005:19).  
 
The second split occurred in 1991 and was motivated by opposition to Garang‟s autocratic 
leadership style and the fall of Mengistu in Ethiopia. The SPLM was divided between forces 
loyal to Garang and those loyal to Riek Machar and Lam Akol (Johnson 2004:91). Initially 
called SPLA-Nasir, Riek and Akol‟s faction changed its name to SPLA-United and South Sudan 
Defense Force (SSDF). Riek‟s group called for Southern independence (Shafer 2007:5). 
However, this was difficult to believe since the group aligned itself with Khartoum and depended 
on the government for military hardware. In 2002, Riek and Garang solved their differences with 




The SPLA conducted the war against the Sudanese government and became a signatory of the 
CPA, which paved the way for the independence of the South.  
 
4.5 The North-South Civil Wars in the Sudan  
 
Failures of the central government to address secessionist grievances can lead to the 
development of full-blown civil wars. In cases of effective armed conflict two factors can 
influence decisively on the outcome: the strategic and tactical advantage of the belligerents and 
external involvement (Wood, 1980:129). These theoretical assumptions were observed in the 
case of South Sudan.  
 
Sudan‟s civil wars began on the run up to independence. It was a complex conflict that lasted for 
nearly five decades spreading to other parts of the country. This section concentrates specifically 
on the North-South dimensions of the civil wars. The conflict was fought in two rounds: the first, 
between 1955 and 1972; and the second between 1983 and 2002. Its immediate causes were 
Southern fears of Northern domination and internal colonization in post-independent Sudan. 
Tensions between the two groups were aggravated by Northern refusal of a bi-state federal 
constitution, policies of Arabization and Islamization (Oromo, 2015:72), and Southern 
underrepresentation in government structures, as a result of the “Sudanisation Policy” (Rogier, 
2005:10).  
 
The first round of Sudan‟s civil wars started on August 18, 1955 after Southern officers from the 
Equatorial Corps stationed in Torit mutinied over fears that they would be disarmed and 
transferred to the North. Similar insurrections within the army, police and prison services broke-
out throughout the South (Johnson, 2011:208). The Sudanese Army suppressed these uprisings. 
Survivors went into hiding in neighboring Uganda, where they established military camps and 
operational centers (Schafer, 2007:3). These escapees formed the nucleus of Southern guerrilla 
forces in later years.  
 
The formation of SANU and the Anyanya guerrilla movement in the mid-1960s introduced a 
new dynamic to the war. These separatist organizations emerged out of discontent with 
Khartoum‟s dismissal of Southern calls for a federal constitution and the implementation of an 
Arab-Islamic assimilation policy in the South (Rogier, 2005:10). During this time the war was 
modestly conducted both in terms of military hardware and strategies (Johnson, 2004:31). 
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Attempts to solve the Southern problem were made at the Round Table Conference in 1965. 
However, the war escalated as the warring parties failed to reach a compromise (Schafer 
2007:3).  
 
Between 1967 and 1972 Sudan‟s first civil war became internationalized as an extension of 
conflicts in the Middle East and the politics of the Cold War. The military government of Jaafar 
Nimeiri aligned itself with the Arab bloc and the socialist states. Consequently, Khartoum 
received substantial military aid from Egypt, Libya and the Soviet Union (Johnson, 2011:212). 
In turn, Israel developed a network of financial and training support to the Anyanya guerrillas 
and the SSLM through Uganda and Ethiopia (Rogier, 2005:11). These developments had serious 
impacts on the course of the war in the South, as the improved position of the Southern guerrilla 
forces demanded a diplomatic solution to the conflict. 
 
In this context, the Sudanese government and the SSLM negotiated a peace agreement that was 
signed by President Nimeiri and Joseph Lagu in Addis Ababa in February 1972. The Addis 
Ababa agreement not only brought peace to the Sudan but also regional autonomy to the South.  
In the words of Dersso (2013:7) “the agreement guaranteed Southern Sudan regional self-
government status within the Republic of Sudan”; It allowed “Southerners to pursue their own 
affairs under a democratically elected regional government” (Heraclides, 1987:213). However, 
Southern regional autonomy came to an end in 1983, after Nimeiri‟s regime took a series of 
decisions that amounted to unilateral abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The decisions 
included: the abolition of the Southern region; declaration of Arabic as the official language in 
the South; and the imposition of sharia law all over the country (Rogier, 2005:16-17).     
 
The second round of Sudan‟s civil war started in 1983 with a mutiny of Southern soldiers in the 
Sudanese army. The rebellion was motivated by “northern promotion of Islamic law, a shortfall 
in the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the continued marginalization of the 
South” (Schafer, 2007:4). These mutineers formed the core of the recently formed SPLA, which 
received external support from the Dergue‟s regime in Ethiopia. Johnson (2011:218) reports that 
initially the SPLA‟s offensives were seasonal: the movement advanced during the rainy season 
receding in the dry season.  
 
A series of important developments took place in 1989: firstly, the SPLA captured all the major 
towns in the South; secondly, peace negotiations between the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi and 
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the SPLA were initiated on the latter‟s term of a secular state; thirdly, the National Islamic Front 
of general Omar al-Bashir staged a coup that overthrew the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi 
suspending the peace negotiations. In 1991 the war became internationalized as neighboring 
countries began to align themselves with the parties to the conflict (Schafer, 2007:4). For 
instance, with the intensification of the civil wars in Ethiopia, Khartoum backed the 
revolutionary forces (the EPLF, the TPLF and the OLF) while the SPLA gave armed support to 
Mengistu‟s regime (Johnson, 2011:219).  
 
The fall of Mengistu in May 1991 impacted negatively on the SPLA. The movement not only 
lost its supplies and main external patron but also faced renewed internal factionalism (Rogier, 
2005:22).  As a result, between 1993 and 1995 the balance of the war tilted towards Khartoum. 
The Sudanese Army‟s momentum began to decline in 1995 as Khartoum‟s regional allies 
Ethiopia and Eritrea became concerned with its Islamist agenda in the region. In addition, 
Uganda began aiding the SPLA in response to Khartoum‟s support to the Lord‟s Resistance 
Army (LRA) (Johnson, 2011:220). By this time the war had already spread to other regions of 
the country including the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Eastern Sudan.  
 
The Sudanese civil war continued intermittently until it was brought to an end through 
diplomatic means in 2002. Negotiations began with the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 
July 20, 2002. The document established the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA), which was signed in 2005. The CPA committed the SPLA and the Khartoum government 
to work for the unity of the country “granting the South the option of an independence 
referendum after an interim period” (Johnson, 2011:221). Consequently, in January 2011 the 
people of Southern Sudan voted for independence from the Sudan, and on July 9, 2011 South 
Sudan emerged as Africa‟s 54
th
 state.  
 
4.6 Explaining the determinants of Southern Sudan’s Successful Secession 
 
At this juncture it is appropriate to ask what factors determined Southern Sudan‟s successful 
political separation from the Sudan? It must be mentioned that South Sudan achieved statehood 
within a hostile international normative framework governing the birth of new states. The 
OAU/AU in particular maintained its views on secession as the antithesis of African statehood 
considering Eritrea an exception to the rule. As an illustration, Somaliland‟s demands for 
statehood remain unresolved while Anjouan and Mohedi‟s withdrawal from the Comoros in 
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1997 was reversed after the harsh sanctions imposed by the OAU. In addition, the North-South 
conflict did not ended with a military victor; rather it was settled on the diplomatic table through 
the CPA. In this context it is reasonable to engage on the determinants of South Sudan‟s 
successful ascent to the heights of statehood. This section argues that the partition of the Sudan 
was the result of a combination of domestic and international factors including: the antagonistic 
historical relations between the northern and southern parts of the Sudan; international search for 
peace and stability in the Sudan; the impacts of “9/11” and the war on terror on the Sudanese 
peace process; and the flaws in the drafting and implementation of the CPA. 
 
4.6.1 Antagonistic historical relations between northern and southern Sudan  
 
The first determining factor for the partition of the Sudan lies on the unfriendly historical nature 
of North-South relations.  
 
Prior to Southern secession, the Sudan was Africa‟s largest country encompassing not only a vast 
expanse of land but also a diverse population. The country was described as a “microcosm” with 
a fundamental division between North and South (Heraclides, 1987:219). According to Holt and 
Daly (1988:3), “the North is, with certain important exceptions, Arabic in speech, and its people 
are universally Muslim”. The South on the other hand, comprises diverse communities, racially 
akin to tropical Africa and adherents to indigenous religions as well as Christianity (Dersso, 
2012:6). This cultural and religious divide has had serious implications on the interactions 
between the two regional communities, shaping the political history of the country. 
 
For centuries, the North centred on Khartoum sought to expand its dominance to the periphery of 
the Sudan. However, early contacts between the people of the North and the inhabitants of the 
South were marked by extreme hostility and brutality (Wassara, 2015:54). As previously 
mentioned, during the Turkiyya (1820-1881) and Mahdiyya (1881-1898) northerners viewed the 
South as a source of slaves, ivory, gold and other natural resources to be pillaged for the benefit 
of the North (Johnson, 2004:7-9). The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1956) ended the 
assault on the people of the South, nevertheless it reinforced the gulf between the two regions 




This legacy of pre-colonial conquest, slave-raiding and resource plundering as well as unequal 
development during the colonial period informed Southern Sudan‟s demands for special 
safeguards within a united Sudan.  
 
However, in post-independent Sudan, the North consistently refused to take Southern demands 
seriously through what Salman (2013:345) termed “a series of broken promises and lost 
opportunities for resolving the problem of South Sudan”. In this regard, it is not a mistake to 
describe the South as an internal colony from 1956 to 1972 (Heraclides, 1987:217). Indeed, 
Northern attitudes towards the Southerners attests to this view: underrepresentation and 
exclusion from the negotiations leading to the country‟s independence; inequitable participation 
in the affairs of the state; dismissal of claims for a federal constitution; forced assimilation 
through the policies of Islamization and Arabization, etc.  
 
Khartoum recognized the right of the people of South Sudan to develop their cultures within a 
unified Sudan in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Southern Sudan was granted a regional 
self-government status under Sudan‟s 1973 Constitution (Dersso, 2012:7). However, Nimeiri‟s 
unilateral abrogation of the peace agreement, the declaration of the Islamic state, declaration of 
Arabic as the official language in the South, and the imposition of sharia law all over the country 
added to the long list of broken promises to the South.  The takeover of government by the 
National Islamic Front (NIF) of general Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi in 1989 further 
alienated the South. The NIF regime referred to the North-South conflict, which lasted until 
2002, as a Jihad, a holy war against Southern “pagans” (Rogier, 2005:21). 
 
It is this long history of violations of democratic processes, socio-economic, political and 
cultural oppression and marginalization that made it clear to local, regional and international 
peace-brokers that the solution to the North-South conflict in the Sudan lied on the acceptance of 
Southern claims for self-determination (Dersso, 2012:7). 
 
4.6.2 International search for peace and stability in the Sudan 
 
The success of South Sudan‟s withdrawal from the Sudan was also facilitated by the efforts of 
numerous external actors to find a diplomatic settlement to the conflict. From 1992 to 2001 
African countries and organizations (driven by various interests) launched successive peace 
initiatives: Nigeria (1992-1993), IGAD (1994-1997), and Egypt and Libya (1999-2001). This 
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“traffic jam of regional peace initiatives” not only provided the foundations for the final 
settlement in 2005, but also complicated the resolution of Africa‟s long running conflict (Rogier, 
2005:36).  
 
Reasoning that the weakened position of the SPLA (after the fall of its Ethiopian patron and the 
split of 1991) would accelerate the resolution of the conflict, Nigerian President Ibrahim 
Babangida launched the Abuja round of negotiations in the early 1992. Southerners demanded 
the exercise of self-determination within a unified Sudan, while the NIF insisted on the 
maintenance of the Sudan as an Islamic state (Johnson, 2004:174). The peace initiatives of Abuja 
failed as a result of the incompatibilities in the positions of the belligerents.   
 
In 1994 Sudan‟s partners in the Intergovernmental Authority for Peace (IGAD) launched a 
multilateral peacemaking process for the Sudan. IGAD member states (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Uganda, Djibouti and Somalia) were concerned with the negative impacts of the war in 
neighboring countries. These included the inflow of refugees and the ensuing precarious 
humanitarian situation, loss of economic opportunities, and Sudan‟s political destabilization of 
the region through sponsorship of rebel groups in the neighboring countries (Shafer, 2007:8). In 
1995 IGAD introduced a Declaration of Principles (DOP) proposing a diplomatic solution to the 
conflict, the unity of the country, religious pluralism and the right of self-determination for the 
South through a referendum (Johnson, 2004:174). Unfortunately, the IGAD peace process 
collapsed as the NFI abandoned the negotiation table in exchange for alternative solutions, which 
included a “peace from within” process with the small SPLA breakaway factions. The IGAD 
peace process resumed in 1997 after Khartoum accepted the DOP as the basis for future 
discussions (Schafer, 2007:5). 
 
Similarly, Libya and Egypt launched a joint peace initiative in 1999. This new initiative helped 
to halt the IGAD peace process. The Libyan-Egyptian initiative, which represented an Arab view 
of the conflict, aimed at countering a “perceived” African domination of the peace process and 
the exclusion of a major Arab stakeholder, Egypt
10
.  By 2001, the initiative had advanced a 
proposal that excluded “all reference to self-determination and secularism but stressed the need 
to preserve the Sudan‟s unity and envisaged inter alia „recognizing Sudan‟s diversity‟, 
                                                 
10
 Egypt‟s stakes in the Sudan comprised access to the Nile‟s waters and the contention of Islamic 
fundamentalism espoused by the NFI 
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„establishing a decentralized government‟, and „forming an interim government‟” (Rogier, 
2005:42). 
 
In 2001 the IGAD peace process was revived as a result of political developments in the United 
States: George W. Bush was inaugurated president at the beginning of the year; John Danforth 
was appointed special envoy on Sudan on September 6; and a few days later the world witnessed 
the terrorist attacks of September 11. The aftershocks of “9/11” “dramatically impacted on the 
bilateral relationship between the US administration and the Government of Sudan, thereby 
creating the environment in which a new international peace saw the light” (Rogier, 2005:45). In 
this regard, the US, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway pressured for renewed 
negotiations resulting in the signing of the Machakos protocol in 2002. The protocol was 
mediated by Kenya under the auspices of IGAD and constituted the foundations for subsequent 
negotiations culminating in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA). 
 
The CPA was signed between Sudan‟s central government and the SPLA in Nairobi on January 
9, 2005. According to Dersso (2012:7), “the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005, which created a democratic basis for sustainable peace, was a momentous development for 
the Sudan and indeed Africa, and brought to a conclusion one of Africa‟s longest civil wars”. 
The central provision of the CPA was the right of Southerners to conduct a referendum on self-
determination after an interim period of six years in which the North and the South would strive 
to make unity attractive.  
 
In accordance with this provision, a referendum was held between 9 and 15 January 2011. The 
majority of Southerners (about 98 percent) voted for independence and after six months the 
Republic of South Sudan emerged as the 54
th
 African state. 
 
4.6.3 The Effects of the US-led War on Terror on the Sudanese Peace Process 
 
The US-led war on terror was instrumental in the partition of the Sudan. In particular, the post-
“9/11” environment, which intensified growing American security concerns with the Sudan. The 
terrorist attacks on September 11 impacted dramatically on the bilateral relationship between 
Washington and Khartoum, thereby creating an environment in which the CPA was signed 
(Rogier, 2005:52). The rationale behind this strategy was Washington‟s perception that 
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“America‟s own security was linked to the outcome of conflicts like that in Sudan” (Young, 
2005:104).  
 
However, from a post-Cold War perspective, US security interests in the Sudan began with the 
assumption of power of the NIF in 1989. The US expressed great concerns at Sudan‟s adoption 
of an aggressive Islamist foreign policy (Young, 2005:104), and its pledge to “spread the Islamic 
revival throughout the Arab and African worlds” (Medani, 2012:284). Washington‟s relations 
with Khartoum became overtly antagonistic between 1991 and 1993 as a result of a number of 
actions and policies followed by the Sudanese government including: providing safe haven for 
terrorists, support for Iraq during the Gulf war, increasing relations with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, etc. (Rogier, 2005:46).  
 
In response, the US included the Sudan in its 1993 list of states that sponsor acts of international 
terrorism (Medani, 2012:284). Furthermore, in November 1996 the US provided USD 20 million 
worth of military hardware to neighboring countries for protection against Sudanese Islamic 
aggression. A year later the US imposed unilateral sanctions against Sudan. In August 1998 the 
US launched cruise missile attacks on pharmaceutical plants in Khartoum (Young, 2005:104). 
The Sudan remained a pariah state throughout the tenure of the Clinton administration between 
1993 and 2000. 
 
The US resumed diplomatic engagements with Khartoum under President George W. Bush. The 
Bush administration‟s continued interests in the Sudan were informed by domestic public 
pressure, oil exploration and terrorism (Rogier, 2005:51). These three parameters triggered 
American involvement in the peace process. In early 2000, the US began talks with Sudan on 
security issues later establishing a counterterrorism bureau in Khartoum. In May 2001 the US 
appointed a Special humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan and on September 6, Senator John 
Danforth was nominated special envoy to the Sudan, with the mandate of brokering a peace 
settlement. 
 
The events of “9/11” strengthened America‟s engagements with the Sudan. A more proactive 
foreign policy was adopted towards the former “terror state” strategically located on the 
intersections of the Middle East and East Africa. The US took a leading role in the peace process 
applying sticks and carrots to the warring parties. The US required the Sudanese government to 
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“cooperate actively on terrorism” while Khartoum responded positively fearing “possible 
American retaliation action” or international integration (Rogier, 2005:52). 
 
In this regard, Young (2005:104) observes that “as American engagements in Sudan intensified, 
the participation of countries from the region, apart from Kenya, in the peace process declined 
and broader geopolitical and security issues came to the fore”. The US influenced the Sudanese 
peace process through IGAD and a troika of partners (the UK, Netherlands, Norway, Italy, etc.). 
These actors negotiated the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002 and the CPA three years 
later.   
4.6.4 Flaws in the drafting and implementation of the CPA  
 
Although the CPA brought Sudan‟s civil wars to a conclusion, the peace agreement was beset by 
numerous shortcomings (both in terms of planning and implementation), which contributed to 
the abandonment of the promise of a united country. In line with the aforementioned, the 
following lines will elaborate on two limitations of the CPA: the exclusivist narrow approach of 
the peace process; and the lack of credibility associated with the national elections held during 
the interim period in April 2010. 
In terms of planning the CPA emerged out of an exclusivist approach to peacemaking: a bilateral 
deal between two formerly warring parties without the participation of other political-military 
and civil society groups. In the words of Medani (2012:288) the CPA was “a negotiated 
agreement among ethnic and military elites, brokered by external parties, who accept a minimal 
form of elite participation designed to achieve political stability while avoiding opposition from 
other forces in society”. The demands for participation by other political forces - such as the 
South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) - were rejected by IGAD and other actors involved in brokering the 
peace settlement (Young, 2005:102).   
 
Indeed, the CPA installed a coalition government between the SPLA and al-Bashir‟s National 
Congress Party (NCP); creating two polities in one country; and establishing an evenly division 
of oil revenues between Khartoum and Juba. The SPLA‟s failure to incorporate the grievances of 
other marginalized groups and regions posed serious threat for achieving sustainable peace and 
stability in the Sudan. It should be observed that by the time the “traffic jam of peace initiatives” 
began in the early 1990s, the conflict in the Sudan had already transcended the North-South 
divide (as acknowledged in the SPLA‟s vision of a “New Sudan”). The eruption of the Darfur 
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conflict in 2003 was an attempt by the insurgents of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) to have 
their voices and grievances heard just like those of Southerners (Young, 2005:102).  
 
Another flaw, this time related to the implementation of the CPA, with special relevance to the 
argument being advanced (the flaws in the nature and execution of the CPA contributed to the 
partition of the Sudan) was the lack of credibility of the electoral process held during the interim 
period between 11 and 15 of April 2010. The process was marred by massive manipulations and 
vote rigging from the start (Medani, 2012:288). Both the SPLA and al-Bashir‟s NCP were driven 
by different objectives. After the death of the pro-unity leader John Garang in 2005, the SPLA 
began to concentrate on governing the South in order to create the necessary conditions for a 
successful referendum. The NCP, on the other hand, focused on maintaining the status quo in the 
North.    
Consequently, the SPLA and al-Bashir‟s regime forged a strategic partnership to ensure that their 
objectives were achieved. This prompted Medani (2012:289) to observe that “the elections of 
April 2010 were not only unrepresentative of Sudanese society, their ultimate purpose was to 
pave the way for the referendum the following year”. In the end both parties achieved their 
objectives: the SPLA won the election in the South with 93 percent; while al-Bashir‟s National 
Congress Party (NCP) held on to power in the North with 68 percent of the vote despite a 




This chapter has provided a narrative of the dynamics of South Sudan‟s long walk to statehood 
as well as an analysis of the determining factors of South Sudan‟s successful political separation 
from the Sudan. The modern history of South Sudan began two hundred years ago and has been 
shaped by resistance against external powers: the Turco-Egyptian regime (1820-1881), the 
Mahdist state (1881-1898), the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1956), and successive 
Northern governments based in Khartoum (1956-2011). 
 
Southern nationalism was shaped by the experiences of antagonistic relations with Northerners: 
the legacy of the slave trade, unequal levels of development, fears of assimilation and rejections 
of demands for federalism, non-discrimination and equal participation. These grievances resulted 
in a civil war that lasted for nearly five decades. The war was fought in two rounds (between 
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1955 and 1972; and between 1983 and 2005). It was settled through a negotiated peace 
agreement, which provided for a referendum on independence by the people of South Sudan.   
 
South Sudan achieved independence (through the phenomenon of secession) in an environment 
that was particularly hostile to the emergence of new states. Hence, this chapter has argued that 
the partition of the Sudan was the result of a combination of domestic and international factors. 
Domestically, the antagonistic historical relations between the northern and southern parts of the 
Sudan as well as the flaws in the drafting and implementation of the CPA played an important 
role. Internationally, the role of external actors in the search for peace and stability in the Sudan 
as well as the impacts of “9/11” and the war on terror on the Sudanese peace process contributed 
to South Sudan‟s independence on July 11, 2011.  
 
The next chapter, which concludes the research, will present a summary of the main findings of 











The purpose of this study was to investigate the determinants of successful secessions in post-
colonial Africa. This goal has been achieved by analyzing the dynamics of secession in Eritrea 
and South Sudan. In view of the conceptual diversity of the phenomenon under scrutiny, the 
study defined secession as “the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally 
recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new state” (Bartkus, 1999:3). Furthermore, the 
expression “successful secession” was used to refer to instances where a secessionist territorial 
unit becomes “institutionalized in a new government, legitimate at home and recognized abroad” 
(Wood, 1980:133). 
 
The study focused on Eritrea and South Sudan for the obvious reason that these two countries 
constitute the only cases of successful secessions on the continent. The analysis of the dynamics 
of secession of these two entities as well as the contributing factors for their successful political 
separation from their respective “parent” states was informed by the theoretical assumptions of 
Wood‟s analytical framework on secession and Coggins‟ international-level model of state birth. 
It is appropriate to reiterate that Wood‟s framework examines the internal dynamics of secession 
(from its inception to culmination in the emergence of a new state); while Coggins‟ model 
explores the politics of the external recognition of secessionist movements and their subsequent 
admission into the international community of states. 
 
Thus, the next section provides a summary of the main findings of the study in relation to the 
questions that oriented the research.  
 
5.2 Summary of findings 
 
The research has underscored that secession is a global phenomenon plaguing all types of 
societies (Bartkus, 1999:3). The African continent in particular has not been immune from 
secessionist conflicts. In this regard, the study started by addressing the question: what are the 
remote and immediate causes of secession in post-colonial Africa?  
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In general terms, the study has concluded that the remote causes of secessionist demands in post-
colonial Africa date back to the scramble of Africa by European colonial powers at the Berlin 
Conference in 1885. However, the adoption of the inherited colonial borders by African leaders 
at the dawn of the independence period (in the early 1960s) coupled with the pledge to uphold 
the inviolable character of those same borders exacerbated the conditions for the emergence of 
secessionist demands. These demands are further deepened by issues of poor governance 
including the politics of domination, exclusion and marginalization of ethnic or regional groups 
by the state (Bamfo, 2012:37; Ylonen, 2013:131).    
 
However, in the particular cases of Eritrea and South Sudan, what factors drove the people of 
these territories to demand full independence from their respective “parent” states?  
 
In relation to Eritrea the study has highlighted that its immediate causes are to be found in the 
UN‟s decision to federate the territory with Ethiopia instead of granting it political independence 
just like other former European territorial possessions in Africa. Furthermore, Emperor Haile 
Selassie‟s systematic dismantlement of Eritrea‟s federal status and the forced incorporation of 
Eritrea into the Ethiopian empire drove the people of Eritrea to take up arms against Ethiopia. In 
South Sudan, demands for self-determination were the result of uneasy relations between 
Northerners and Southerners shaped by pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial factors 
including: the legacy of the slave trade; unequal levels of development; fears of assimilation; and 
rejections of demands for federalism, non-discrimination and equal participation by the Northern 
political elite based in Khartoum.  
 
The people of Eritrea and South Sudan achieved statehood after decades of conflict against their 
respective “parent” states. It is necessary to reiterate that both Eritrea and South Sudan 
conducted their struggle for independence and achieved independence in an environment that 
was particularly hostile to the emergence of new states through the process of secession. As 
previously mentioned, the international fear of global and regional “balkanization” disallowed 
the recognition and material support to secessionist movements. In particular, the OAU and the 
AU‟s pledge to uphold the inviolable character of African borders made it virtually impossible 
for secessionist movements to succeed. Indeed, major secessionist attempts in Africa such as 




Then, what factors explain the successful outcome of Eritrea and South Sudan‟s political 
separation from their “parent states”?  
 
The study has explicated that Eritrea and South Sudan‟s successful secessions were the result of 
a combination of domestic and external factors. In the case of Eritrea the study has argued that 
domestic factors such as the military defeat of the Ethiopian army and the Dergue‟s policies of 
alienation were instrumental. External factors also played a decisive role in the process, 
especially Eritrea‟s historical and legal claims to sovereignty, the end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the window of opportunity for the emergence of new states as 
well as the mediating role of the United States. In the case of South Sudan the study has argued 
that factors such as the antagonistic historical relations between northerners and southerners, the 
flaws in the planning and execution of the CPA, the role of external actors in the search for peace 
and stability in the Sudan, and the impacts of “9/11” and the war on terror on the Sudanese peace 
process contributed to South Sudan‟s independence on July 11, 2011.  
 
This leads to the last question: what lessons can be drawn from the experiences of Eritrea and 
South Sudan in terms of the dynamics and determinants of successful secessions in post-colonial 
Africa? The answer requires a separate section.  
 
6.3 Lessons to be drawn from the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan 
 
The secessions of Eritrea and South Sudan developed more or less along the same lines. The 
process leading to the secession of these two territories began with ethno-regional grievances, 
followed by the establishment of secessionist organizations and the development of armed 
struggle for independence. These secessionist conflicts were settled through internationally 
sponsored peace agreements, which provided for the exercise of the right to external self-
determination through a referendum. In both cases the referendum was followed by international 
recognition of the secessionist states and their subsequent admission into the international 
community of states.  
 
In this regard, the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan provide a number of lessons in terms of the 




First, Eritrea and South Sudan demonstrate that African borders can be changed and maps 
redrawn. Indeed, although the OAU (and its successor the AU) uphold the sacrosanct character 
of African borders, the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan indicate that the territorial integrity of 
the post-colonial state can be tempered with when it impinges on people‟s rights to self-
determination. However, outside the colonial context, the right of peoples to external self-
determination has been applied under special circumstances. Firstly, to effect deferred 
decolonization (Eritrea and Namibia); and secondly, to “remedy” massive injustices where a 
people is denied the opportunity to enjoy its right to internal self-determination (South Sudan).  
 
Second, secessionist conflicts tend to be prolonged involving high civilian casualties. The 
conflicts in Eritrea and South Sudan were at different stages known as “Africa‟s longest civil 
war”. Eritrean struggle for independence lasted for nearly three decades (1962-1991) killing 
more than 150 thousands people. The North-South conflict in the Sudan lasted for five decades 
(1955-2005), producing around 2 million civilian deaths and uprooting almost five million 
people from their homes. That is so because of the centrality of territory for the state. Territorial 
fragmentation of the state is a threat against the very definition of the state; as a result, central 
governments often attempt to militarily subdue separatist groups, while secessionists fight 
passionately for their homeland. These elements turn secessionist conflicts into protracted and 
highly destructive wars.  
 
Third, external support for the warring parties not only escalates secessionist conflicts but also 
helps to sustain them. The secessionist conflicts in Eritrea and South Sudan began as 
unconventional guerrilla struggles developing into conventional warfare once secessionists 
managed to gather considerable trained cadres and significant military hardware. These 
developments were influenced by the intervention of external political actors driven by self- 
interests. In the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan, these developments became evident during the 
establishment of secessionist organizations and the conduct of the secessionist struggle. In both 
cases the central government and the secessionists received help from neighboring countries and 
other states supportive of their causes.   
 
Fourth, the interests of powerful states play a decisive role in the settlement of secessionist 
conflicts. Regional and international peacemaking initiatives to settle the conflicts in Eritrea and 
South Sudan were linked to the geostrategic and political interests of powerful states. The US 
was instrumental in opposing and championing Eritrean secession. At the center of American 
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policy towards Eritrea was the search for stability in the Horn of Africa. During the Cold War 
the US opposed Eritrean secession. In 1991 (with the collapse of the USSR and a militarily 
strong EPLF) the US began championing Eritrean secession. Failure by the United States in 
supporting Eritrean secession would have led to the destabilization of the Horn as the EPLF 
would have effectively resumed war against Ethiopia or simply proclaimed a unilateral 
secession. In the Sudan, IGAD member states became involved in seeking a diplomatic solution 
to the conflict once the Sudanese conflict became internationalized affecting the national security 
of neighboring states. Moreover, American engagements in the Sudanese peace process were 
driven by national interests, including security (pressure from Christian Evangelicals, oil 
companies and the terrorist attacks of September 11).  
 
Fifth, successful secessions require the consent of the parent state followed by international 
recognition. Eritrea and South Sudan attained statehood with the blessing of Ethiopia and the 
Sudan respectively followed by recognition by other states including the OAU/AU member 
states. The element of “parent” states‟ consent and international recognition has played against 
other self-proclaimed states in Africa such as Biafra (Nigeria), Katanga (DRC), Somaliland 
(Somaliland), Anjouan and Mohedi (Comoros), and Azawadi (Mali). 
 
Finally, the emergence of new states through secession in post-colonial Africa has not brought 
about peace and stability in the continent. The consolidation of Eritrean statehood has not been 
successful: the country failed to democratize turning into an authoritarian military state; Eritrea 
fought a war against Ethiopia over a border demarcation between 1998 and 2000; Eritrea‟s 
international relations with Western nations and neighboring countries are tense due to diversion 
of humanitarian aid to military purposes and poor human rights records. Similarly, the 
independence of South Sudan did not end conflicts with the Sudan. Fights erupted as a result of 
disputes border demarcations and sharing in the profits of oil exploitation. In addition, since 
December 2013, South Sudan has plunged into a civil war between forces loyal to President 
Salva Kiir and forces loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar.  
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks  
 
 
Secession is a complex phenomenon. This research has attempted to address a specific 
dimension of the phenomenon: the determinants of successful secessions in post-colonial Africa 
by analyzing the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan. This deliberate delimitation of the research 
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problem is an indication that the study did not seek to exhaust the entire problematic of 
secessionism in Africa. Consequently, more studies are needed for a better understanding of the 
phenomenon under scrutiny. 
 
In this regard, future research should focus on exploring the aftermath secessionist developments 
in Africa. For instance, how has the secession of Eritrea and South Sudan affected their “parent” 
states? Since secession has not brought about socio-political stability and created an environment 
conducive to economic development in Eritrea and South Sudan was statehood the right option 
for these entities? Are there indicators to determine the success of secessionist states? What are 
the alternatives to secession?  
 
In addition, more attention should be paid to the emerging connection between militant Islam 
and secession in Africa as evinced by the cases of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, the 
Mombasa Republican Council in Kenya, and other movements in Zanzibar (Tanzania), Ogaden 
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